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Introduction
1.1 Three Essays on Macroeconomics
The global financial crises has drawn attention to several phenomena at the inter-
section of macroeconomics and finance. They are: (1) asymmetric information and the
optimal use of the available information (i.e. the flash forecasts of GDP and inflation);
(2) adjustments in credit supply as a critical channel by which market risk becomes sys-
temic; (3) bank funding conditions as major determinants of bank lending decisions; (4)
central bank liquidity as a substitute for market liquidity when private credit vanishes;
(5) departure from the standard rational expectation hypothesis towards a benchmark
where the agents are able to learn and create their own expectations.
The present thesis aims to study the importance of some of these phenomena from a
macroeconomic perspective with a focus on the interaction between the monetary policies
and the real economy. This dissertation consists of three chapters, all of them are self-
contained works.
The first chapter of the thesis consists of an extension of the asymmetric preference
model suggested by Ruge-Murcia (2003a) to investigate the use of real-time data, which
roughly measures the type of data available to policy makers when making their decisions,
and revised data which more accurately measure economic performance (Croushore, 2011).
In the extended model, the central banker monitors a weighted average of revised and real-
time inflation. Moreover, the asymmetric central bank can focus on real-time inflation
depending on whether the unemployment rate is high or low. It identifies a source of
inflation bias due to inflation revisions. The empirical results suggest that the Federal
Reserve Bank focuses on monitoring revised inflation during low unemployment periods,
but it weights real-time inflation heavily during high unemployment periods. In contrast,
the Bank of England seems to focus on an equally-weighted average of real-time and
revised inflation when monitoring inflation which is fairly robust over the business cycle.
Monetary policy may reflect the impact of real-time data, which roughly measures
the type of data available to central bankers at the time when their decisions are made,
as well as revised data which more accurately measure economic performance. First
announcements of many macroeconomic variables -e.g. the rate of inflation and GDP- for
a given quarter are released around the middle of the following quarter, well before the final
release, which takes place roughly three years after the first announcement. Due to these
long lags, central bankers face an important conflict. Ideally, they might aim to influence
the performance of the actual economy based on optimal forecasts, but because of the long
lags associated with the revised data that most accurately measure this performance their
actual forecasts might be affected by the most readily available data arriving in real time;
this is because market participants’ evaluations of monetary policy performance, and by
1
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the same token central bank inflation monitoring, are likely to be based at least partially
on real-time data components, which do not help to forecast optimally revised data. As
noted by Croushore (2011), if the discrepancy between real-time and revised data were
characterized by a pure news component-as opposed to a noise component-then the lags
associated with data revisions would not be an issue because real-time data would be an
optimal forecast of revised data. However this is not the case because revisions usually
incorporate both news and noise components (see Aruoba (2008) and references therein),
which means that there is some predictability in these data revisions. Moreover, it is
extremely difficult, if not impossible to distinguish the news and noise components of
expected revisions in real time in an always changing economic environment. All these
features may induce policy-makers to make decisions that deviate from decisions that
simply reflect revised data.
Our paper contributes to the large body of theoretical literature which investigates
the possibility that central bankers may induce an upward bias in inflation. Barro and
Gordon (1983) suggest that central bankers might be unable to make long-term policy
commitments, which might lead them to pursue policies which create surprise inflation.
This proposition generated considerable interest with numerous empirical papers (e.g.
Ireland 1999) showing mixed results. More recently, Ruge-Murcia (2003,a, 2004) develop
a new theory suggesting that a central banker featuring asymmetric preferences might
induce an inflation bias.1 In the model of Ruge-Murcia (2003a, 2004), the inflation bias
arises because the monetary authority takes stronger action when unemployment is above
the natural rate than when it is below the natural rate. A similar finding is shown
by Cassou, Scott and Vázquez (2012), who posit an asymmetric preference model which
focuses on an output asymmetry rather than an unemployment asymmetry. In their model
the inflation bias arises because the central banker takes stronger action when output is
below its permanent level than when it is above. None of these papers find support for
the surprise inflation hypothesis à la Barro and Gordon, but they provide strong evidence
in favor of the asymmetric preference hypothesis suggested by Ruge-Murcia (2003a).
We extend the model by Ruge-Murcia (2003a, 2004) by assuming that the monetary
authority wants to monitor a weighted average of both revised and real-time inflation
forecasts. As motivated above, the inclusion of real-time inflation in the formulation of
a central banker objective function is due to the long lag in the releases of final inflation
revisions, which might result in a central banker paying attention to real-time inflation
forecasts even if they are not rational forecasts of revised inflation. This hypothesis of
central bank monitoring of real-time inflation may also reflect the inability of a central
banker to make long-term policy commitments as in Barro and Gordon (1983), but the
inability studied in this paper is due to a different issue. In particular, here a central
banker might be forced to focus on real-time inflation forecasts as a result of short-term
pressures from other policy makers, economic pundits of public opinion.2 Moreover, we
explore the hypothesis that the relative importance of real-time inflation forecasts in
central bankers’ decision-making may be greater during high unemployment periods due
to political pressures to react quickly to bad news. Thus, political pressures can also
induce asymmetric central bank responses to inflation in real-time decisions making. As
1Early papers putting forward central banker asymmetric preferences are Cukierman (2001) and
Robert Nobay and Peel (2003). Another approach followed by Surico (2007) focuses on monetary policy
rule asymmetries.
2That is, the central banker may be more worried about the policy evaluation based on real-time data
made in the near future than the one based on revised data, which can be implemented when these data
become available only after a long delay.
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a result, the importance of an inflation bias induced from the differences between revised
and real-time inflation data, as in the traditional inflation bias sources suggested by Barro
and Gordon (1983) and Ruge-Murcia (2003a, 2004), is likely to be a consequence of the
degree of central bank independence, which can differ from country to country.
Our empirical results clearly show that both the Federal Reserve and the Bank of
England take into account real–time inflation forecasts when implementing monetary
policy, which induces an important new inflation bias source in both countries, although
they do so in quite different ways. The Federal Reserve focuses on monitoring revised
inflation during low unemployment periods, but it weights real-time inflation heavily in
its decision making during high unemployment episodes. These results are in line with
those found in Cassou et al. (2016). In contrast, the Bank of England uses a roughly
equally-weighted average of real-time and revised inflation in its decision making which
is fairly robust over the business cycle. Moreover, as in Ruge-Murcia (2003a, 2004) and
Cassou et al. (2012) we find that the Ruge-Murcia asymmetric preference bias remains
significant. In particular, the preferences of the two central banks are asymmetric, with
stronger action taken when unemployment (output) is above (below) its natural rate
(potential level) than when it is below (above).
As noted above, this new source of inflation bias can be a consequence of the degree of
central bank independence that can differ form country to country. In order to compare
the different degrees of real-time targeting we extend our analysis to other Central Banks.
Specifically, we include two European countries with independent monetary policies and
three countries outside the European Union. Our results show that real-time inflation is
an important new inflation bias source for all the countries except Sweden. Specifically,
the central banks of Australia and New Zealand follow closely the targeting policy of the
Fed. This is in contrast to the central banks of Canada and Denmark that seem to be
more like to the targeting policy of the Bank of England but they weight less heavily
revised data during bad economic times. However, the central bank of Sweden seems not
to take into account real-time data in their policy decision making at all.
The second chapter presents and evaluates a model that helps study the role of the
financial sector in the Spanish liquidity trap. We find that the agency problems, the
liquidity constraints facing banks and risk shocks that hit financial intermediation are
primary determinants of economic fluctuations. They have been critical triggers and
propagators in the recent financial crisis. The liquidity policies enacted by the European
Central Bank (ECB) seem to have greatly attenuated the impact of the spread of financial
panic.
Our model is a variant of Christiano et al. (2014), we integrate a foreign sector that
supplies government bonds to the Spanish banks of the type studied by Moreno et al.
(2014). The real economy is made of households and firms. Households are composed of
workers, capital producers and entrepreneurs. The working households consume, supply
differentiated work in a monopolistic labour market, and allocate savings as deposits to
the bank. Capital producers combine undepreciated physical capital with new investment
subject to an idiosyncratic shock that try to emulate the success and the failure of sev-
eral projects. Entrepreneurial households have a special ability to operate capital. They
acquire plant capacity from capital producers, extract production services from it and
resell the stock of undepreciated capital at the end of the production cycle, and accumu-
late net worth in the process. Net worth is used to pay for capital in the next period.
But, in order to run their activity entrepreneurs need to borrow a fraction of the value
of capital which they are not able to self-finance. The bank provides resources to finance
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entrepreneurs’ investment projects using the deposits placed by households. Firms pro-
ducing intermediate goods are monopolists and subject to a standard Calvo mechanism
with partial indexation for price setting.
Idiosyncratic uncertainty in the financial sector has been introduced in models by
Bernanke et al. (1999). More recently, Christiano et al. (2014) make this idiosyncratic
uncertainty time-varying through risk shocks that modify the standard deviation of id-
iosyncratic shocks to the productivity of private borrowers and lead to macroeconomic
fluctuations. By doing so, their paper provides a new transmission channel of uncertainty
to business cycles through financial frictions that we use in this paper.
We estimate the model for Spain over the period 2000Q1-2017Q4. We use quarterly
observations of ten macroeconomic time series that are mainly used in the estimation
of DSGE models and three financial series : credit to non financial corporations, en-
trepreneurial net worth and the risk premium of sovereign bonds. Our results suggest
that anticipated risk shocks dominate all the other shocks. Moreover, our results show
that 52% of the variability of output and 89% of the variability of credit in the business
cycle accounted by anticipated risk shocks in the economy. Those shocks explain the
episode of credit crunch and contraction of investment and output. Such a sequence has
been observed during the last recession of 2007 in Spain.
In the third chapter we estimate a medium-scale DSGE model both under rational
expectations and adaptive learning using a rolling window approach to analyze parameter
variability. The different model extension also allows us to explore the hypothesis that
the parameters in the DSGE models used to study aggregate fluctuations are in general
time-varying (Inoue and Rossi (2011)). Estimation results show that including adaptive
learning improves the fit of the model and helps reduce by around 68% the variation
in estimated structural parameters. Moreover, our results suggest that the inclusion of
adaptive learning helps explaining the recent swings in the comovements between real and
nominal US macroeconomic variables.
Recent literature shows evidence that the parameters in the DSGE models used to
study aggregate fluctuations are in general time-varying (see, among others, Inoue and
Rossi (2011), Canova and Ferroni (2012), Castelnuovo (2012a,b), Hurtado (2014), Casares
and Vázquez (2018), Castelnuovo and Pellegrino (2018), Canova (2019)). These findings
have important implications. On the one hand, the instability of structural parameters
somewhat weakens the ability of DSGE models to assess policies reliably (Fernández-
Villaverde et al. (2007)). On the other hand, parameter variability may be an important
source for explaining the macroeconomic dynamic swings observed during the post-WWII
era in the US.
This paper analyzes parameter variability by estimating the canonical medium-scale
DSGE model suggested by Smets and Wouters (2007) under both RE and AL following
Slobodyan and Wouters (2012a,b) approach to AL. Both versions of the model are es-
timated for the whole sample and then using a 20-year rolling-window approach. Our
estimation results show that learning dynamics help to explain a large proportion of the
parameter variability observed under the standard RE hypothesis typically assumed in
macroeconomic modelling. The intuition is simple: Under RE, a time-invariant relation-
ship links the endogenous variables to the (predetermined and exogenous) state variables
of the economy whenever the structural parameters of the model are constant. Therefore,
parameter variability becomes the only source of macroeconomic dynamic swings under
RE other than that generated from the exogenous shocks of the model. By contrast, the
relationship linking endogenous variables with state variables becomes time varying under
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AL even when the structural parameters are time invariant, which might result in much
richer macroeconomic dynamics.
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Inflation monitoring in real time: A
comparative analysis of the Federal
Reserve and the Bank of England
“There is no universal best price index, but rather different indexes depending
on what you are trying to measure”
– Reis (2009)
2.1 Abstract
This paper extends the asymmetric preference model suggested by Ruge-Murcia (2003b)
to investigate the use of real-time data which roughly measure the type of data available
to policy makers when making their decisions and revised data which more accurately
measure economic performance (Croushore, 2011). In our extended model, the central
banker monitors a weighted average of revised and real-time inflation. Moreover, we al-
low for an asymmetric central bank focus on real-time inflation depending on whether
the unemployment rate is high or low. Our model identifies a source of inflation bias due
to inflation revisions. Our empirical results suggest that the US Federal Reserve Bank
focuses on monitoring revised inflation during low unemployment periods, but it weights
real-time inflation heavily during high unemployment periods. The Reserve Bank of Aus-
tralia and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand seem to follow the policies of the US Fed
by weighting mainly real-time data in bad economics times. In contrast, the Bank of
England seems to focus on an equally-weighted average of real-time and revised inflation
when monitoring inflation which is fairly robust over the business cycle. However, the
Bank of Canada and the Denmark National Bank target mainly revised data during high
unemployment periods. In contrast to the other central banks studied, the estimation re-
sults suggest that the Central Bank of Sweden does not take real-time data into account
in monitoring their monetary policy.
2.2 Introduction
Monetary policy may reflect the impact of real-time data, which roughly measures
the type of data available to central bankers at the time when their decisions are made,
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as well as revised data which more accurately measures economic performance.1 First
announcements of many macroeconomic variables -e.g. the rate of inflation and GDP- for
a given quarter are released around the middle of the following quarter, well before the
final release, which takes place roughly 3 years after the first announcement. Due to these
long lags, central bankers face an important conflict. Ideally, they might aim to influence
the performance of the actual economy based on optimal forecasts, but because of the long
lags associated with the revised data that most accurately measure this performance their
actual forecasts might be affected by the most readily available data arriving in real time;
this is because market participants’ evaluations of monetary policy performance, and by
the same token central bank inflation monitoring, are likely to be based at least partially
on real-time data components, which do not help to forecast optimally revised data. As
noted by Croushore (2011), if the discrepancy between real-time and revised data were
characterized by a pure news component -as opposed to a noise component- then the
lags associated with data revisions would not be an issue because real-time data would
be an optimal forecast of revised data. However this is not the case because revisions
usually incorporate both news and noise components (see Aruoba (2008) and references
therein), which means that there is some predictability in these data revisions. Moreover,
it is extremely difficult, if not impossible to distinguish the news and noise components
of expected revisions in real time in an always changing economic environment. All these
features may induce policy-makers to make decisions that deviate from decisions that
simply reflect revised data.
Our paper contributed to the large body of theoretical literature which investigates
the possibility that central bankers may induce an upward bias in inflation. Barro and
Gordon (1983) suggest that central bankers might be unable to make long-term policy
commitments, which might lead them to pursue policies which create surprise inflation.
This proposition generated considerable interest with numerous empirical papers (e.g.
Ireland 1999) showing mixed results. More recently, Ruge-Murcia (2003a,b, 2004) develop
a new theory suggesting that a central banker featuring asymmetric preferences might
induce an inflation bias.2 In the model of Ruge-Murcia (2003b, 2004), the inflation bias
arises because the monetary authority takes stronger action when unemployment is above
the natural rate than when it is below the natural rate. A similar finding is shown by
Cassou, Scott and Vázquez (2012), who posit an asymmetric preference model which
focuses on an output asymmetry rather than an unemployment asymmetry. In their
1The impact of the revisions process on the empirical evaluation of monetary policy has been widely
investigated in the literature -see Croushore (2011) and references therein. A pioneering article by
Maravall and Pierce (1986) investigates how preliminary and incomplete data affect monetary policy.
They show that even if revisions to measures of money supply are large, monetary policy will not be
much different if more accurate data are known whenever policymakers are able to optimally extract the
signal from the data. More recently, Orphanides (2001), among others, shows that real-time measurement
problems of conceptual variables, such as output gap, may induce policymaking errors. Croushore and
Evans (2006) show evidence that the use of a Vector Autoregressive model (VAR) based on revised data
may not be a serious limitation for recursive identification of monetary policy shocks. Nevertheless, their
analysis also shows that many simultaneous VAR systems identifiable when real-time data issues are
ignored cannot be completely identified when these measures are considered. All these studies consider
US real-time data. More recently, Fernandez, Branch, Koenig and Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy (2011) assemble
a real-time data set for the OECD countries. In line with the US data revisions features reported below,
they find that statistical agencies from OECD countries tend to underestimate both real output growth
and inflation.
2Early papers putting forward central banker asymmetric preferences are Cukierman (2001) and
Robert Nobay and Peel (2003). Another approach followed by Surico (2007) focuses on monetary policy
rule asymmetries.
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model the inflation bias arises because the central banker takes stronger action when
output is below its permanent level than when it is above. None of these papers find
support for the surprise inflation hypothesis à la Barro and Gordon (1983), but they
provide strong evidence in favor of the asymmetric preference hypothesis suggested by
Ruge-Murcia (2003b).
We extend the model by Ruge-Murcia (2003b, 2004) by assuming that the monetary
authority wants to monitor a weighted average of both revised and real-time inflation
forecasts. As motivated above, the inclusion of real-time inflation in the formulation of
a central banker objective function is due to the long lag in the releases of final inflation
revisions, which might result in a central banker paying attention to real-time inflation
forecasts even if they are not rational forecasts of revised inflation. This hypothesis of
central bank monitoring of real-time inflation may also reflect the inability of a central
banker to make long-term policy commitments as in Barro and Gordon (1983), but the
inability studied in this paper is due to a different issue. In particular, here a central
banker might be forced to focus on real-time inflation forecasts as a results of short-
term pressures form other policy makers, economic pundits or public opinion.3 Moreover,
we explore the hypothesis that the relative importance of real-time inflation forecasts in
central bankers’ decision-making may be greater during high unemployment periods due
to political pressures to react quickly to bad news. Thus, political pressures can also
induce asymmetric central bank responses to inflation in real-time decisions making. As
a result, the importance of an inflation bias induced from the differences between revised
an real-time inflation data, as in the traditional inflation bias sources suggested by Barro
and Gordon (1983) and Ruge-Murcia (2003b, 2004), is likely to be a consequence of the
degree of central bank independence, which can differ from country to country.
By following Ruge-Murcia (2003b, 2004) we are considering a targeting rule approach
(e.g. Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999 and Svensson, 1999) by first defining a central bank’s
loss function whose arguments are the monetary policy targets, where these targets in our
extended framework can be affected by real-time issues due to the long lags associated
with the releases of revised data. This is in contrast with the instrument rule approach
(McCallum and Nelson, 2005) usually followed in the related literature to analyze the
importance of real-time data (e.g. Orphanides, 2001).4 The targeting rule and the instru-
ment rule approaches can be viewed as two alternative ways (each with its pros and cons)
of dealing with real-time issues. In this perspective, the targeting rule approach adopted
in this paper is suitable for identifying potential sources of inflation bias (i.e. those in-
duced by asymmetric central bank preferences à la Ruge-Murcia and those induced by
data revisions) in a rather simple framework.
Our model with inflation data revisions identifies a potential source of inflation bias
that arises due to two features as suggested in Cassou, Scott and Vázquez (2016): First,
the lag of revised inflation measurements with respect to their initial announcements,
which may explain why a central banker may pay attention to real-time inflation; and
second, the asymmetric central bank focus on real-time inflation may differ depending
on whether the economy is doing well or not. The approach followed in this papers is
fairly close to the one followed in Cassou et al. (2016) with a few important differences.
3That is, the central banker may be more worried about the policy evaluation based on real-time data
made in the near future than the one based on revised data, which can be implemented when these data
become available only after a long delay.
4As emphasized below, an attractive feature of Ruge-Murcia’s formulation is that the policy instrument
is left unspecified. Hence, the optimal inflation rate is robust to alternative operating procedures and
instrument rules used by central bankers, which avoids a potential source of misspecification.
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We focus on the asymmetric preference model of Ruge-Murcia (2003b, 2004) based on
asymmetric preferences on unemployment instead of the asymmetric preference model
based on asymmetric preferences on output suggested in Cassou et al. (2012). As explained
below, this strategy enables us to better identify the source of bias due to inflation revisions
by using a maximum likelihood approach instead of an instrumental variable approach
as used in Cassou et al. (2016) . In addition, we extend our analysis to investigate UK
data as well as the US data studied in their paper. This enables us to make a comparison
between the ways in which the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England deal with non-
trivial inflation revisions in the characterization of monetary policy.
Our empirical results clearly show that both the Federal Reserve and the Bank of
England take into account real–time inflation forecasts when implementing monetary
policy, which induces an important new inflation bias source in both countries, although
they do so in quite different ways. The Federal Reserve focuses on monitoring revised
inflation during low unemployment periods, but it weights real-time inflation heavily in
its decision making during high unemployment episodes. These results are in line with
those found in Cassou et al. (2016). In contrast, the Bank of England uses a roughly
equally-weighted average of real-time and revised inflation in its decision making which
is fairly robust over the business cycle. Moreover, as in Ruge-Murcia (2003b, 2004) and
Cassou et al. (2012) we find that the Ruge-Murcia asymmetric preference bias remains
significant. In particular, the preferences of the two central banks are asymmetric, with
stronger action taken when unemployment (output) is above (below) its natural rate
(potential level) than when it is below (above).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.3 extends the model of Ruge-
Murcia (2003b, 2004) by assumming that the central banker wants to monitor a weighted
average of both revised an real-time inflation. Section 2.4 shows the estimation results.
In Section 2.5 we extend the analysis to several countries. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.3 The model
Following Ruge-Murcia (2003b, 2004), the theoretical model consists of a central
banker with the dual mandate of stabilizing inflation and unemployment rates around
respective targets. These decisions are complicated by the fact that accurate short term
measurements for inflation-i.e. revised inflation data-are only available after a long de-
lay. We regard the revised inflation time series, that is data that appear in conventional
databases such as Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), as more accurately measuring
actual inflation, but because of the long lags associated with revising these inflation data,
real-time inflation data may affect the central banker’s decision-making. Furthermore, the
extent to which the monetary authority considers real-time inflation in its decision-making
may depend on whether the economy is doing well or not.
To investigate the extent to which real-time inflation releases potentially matter in
central bank decision-making and possibility that this extent may be different in low
and high unemployment periods, we build on the inflation-unemployment asymmetric
preference model suggested in Ruge-Murcia (2003b, 2004). This model begings with a
short run Phillips curve given by:
ut = unt − µ (πt − πet ) + ηt (2.1)
where ut is observed unemployment at time t, unt is the natural rate of unemployment
at time t, πt is the-actual or revised-inflation rate at time t, πet is the public’s forecast of
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inflation at time t constructed at time t− 1, and ηt is a supply disturbance. The natural
rate of unemployment changes over time according to
∆unt = ψ − (1− δ)unt−1 + θ∆unt−1 + ξt (2.2)
where ξt is serially uncorrelated and normally distributed with mean zero and standard
deviation σξ. Note that this formulation is rather general. Thus, when σ = 1 the model
imposes a unit root process for the rate of unemployment, while when σ 6= 1 there is no
stochastic trend.
In the Ruge-Murcia model, the central banker monitors actual inflation. More pre-
cisely, actual inflation for the period is assumed to be simply determined as the sum of a
policy instrument, it, chosen by the monetary authority and a control error, εt, so that
πt = it + εt (2.3)
where εt is serially uncorrelated and normally distributed with mean zero and standard
deviation σε. An attractive feature of Ruge-Murcia’s formulation is that the policy in-
strument, it, is left unspecified. The optimal inflation rate is thus robust to alternative
operating procedures used by central bankers over long sample periods, which avoids a
potential source of misspecification. In particular, this formulation accommodates the
alternative ways that central bankers may have used to implement monetary policy over
the years. From instrument rules that set the rate of growth of nominal money as the
policy instrument in the 60’s and 70’s to interest rate rules -e.g. the Taylor rule- used
during the great moderation periods, and the unconventional monetary polices used by
central bankers when dealing with the great recession and the zero lower bound issue.
Since our main objectives are, first, to investigate the degree to which the central
banker weights real-time versus revised inflation data and, second to analyze whether the
weighting or real-time inflation depends on whether the economy is doing well or not,
we assume that the central banker wishes to monitor a weighted average of these two
data types instead of monitoring only actual-revised-inflation as assumed by (2.3) in the
Ruge-Murcia model. Formally, we introduce a parameter λπj ∈ [0, 1] for j = b, g to index
whether the economy is in a good or low unemployment state (j = g) or in a a bad or high
unemployment state (j = b).5 To be more specific, when the economy is in state j, λπj = 0
indicates that the central banker focuses only on real-time inflation, λπj = 1 indicates that
the central banker focuses only on revised inflation and λπj ∈ (0, 1) indicates that policy
monitoring is determined by an average of these two inflation data types. Under this
formulation one can interpret (1− λπj ) as a measure of the short-term pressure extended
on the central banker by the government and other economic agents to focus on the real-
time inflation forecast when the economy is in regime j. One reasonable prior is that the
monetary authority might weight real-time data more heavily than revised data in high
unemployment periods (i.e. (1−λπb ) > (1−λπg ) or λπg > λπb ) because during such periods it
might be under stronger short-term pressure from other policy makers, economic pundits
or public opinion to fulfil its dual mandate of stabilizing both inflation and unemployment.
5We use the unemployment rate as a measure for economic performance because it is a major economic
variable targeted by the Federal Reserve Bank. Moreover, it is observed in real-time and is not revised
beyond a few seasonal adjustments. Furthermore, the choice of the rate of unemployment as the threshold
variable is in line with the role played by the rate of unemployment in the asymmetric preference model
of Ruge-Murcia (2003b, 2004) of signalling whether the economy is in good times (low unemployment) or
in bad times (high unemployment).
12 2. INFLATION MONITORING IN REAL TIME
We use the weighting structure outlined above to extend the policy structure in Ruge-
Murcia (2003b, 2004). In particular, rather than simply choosing the policy instrument
it to monitor revised inflation, the central bank chooses the policy instrument to monitor
a weighted average of both revised and real-time inflation. Furthermore, also as noted
above, we allow the degree to which these two inflation measures are weighted to differ
depending on whether the economy is currently in a low unemployment period or a high
unemployment period. This means that our modified equation linking the policy instru-
ment, it, and the average inflation measure monitored by the central banker, π̃t, is given
by
π̃t = it + εt (2.4)
where π̃t is given by





πrt is the first announcement-real-time observation-of inflation, εt is serially uncorrelated
disturbance with mean zero and standard deviation σε as in (2.3) and It is a dummy
indicating the strength of the economy in period t given by
It =
0 if ut ≤ uT1 if ut > uT (2.6)
where ut is the unemployment rate and uT is the threshold value. Equation (2.6) shows
that the dummy variable takes a value of 1 during high unemployment periods and 0
otherwise.
The remaining blocks of the model are identical to those in Ruge-Murcia’s model,
with the difference of considering the average of inflation, π̃t, instead of revised inflation,
πt. Thus, the central banker selects it in an effort to minimize her expected loss function
that penalizes variations of unemployment and average inflation of the two types of data











(exp (γ (ut − u∗t ))− γ (ut − u∗t )− 1) (2.7)
where γ 6= 0 and φ > 0 are preference parameters, and π∗t and u∗t are target rates of
inflation and unemployment, respectively. As in Ireland (1999) and Ruge-Murcia (2003b,
2004), it is assumed that π∗t is constant denoted by π∗. The linex function characterizing
unemployment allows for asymmetric preferences on unemployment by assigning differ-
ent weights depending on the sign of deviations from the target in unemployment.6 In
particular, for γ > 0 positive deviations in unemployment from the target are weighted
more than negative ones in the monetary authority’s loss function. Also notice that the
asymmetric loss function on unemployment nests the symmetric (quadratic) loss function
whenever γ goes to zero. Thus, the presence of asymmetric central bank preferences on
unemployment can be uncovered by running a test on whether γ is significant.
As in the model in Ruge-Murcia (2003b), we define ξt to be the 3 × 1 vector that
contains the model’s structural shocks at time t. It is assumed that ξt is serially un-
correlated, normally distributed with zero mean, and (possibly) exhibiting conditional
6The lines function was introduced by Varian (1975) in the context of Bayesian econometric analysis.
More recently, Robert Nobay and Peel (2003) introduced it into the optimal monetary policy analysis.
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heteroskedasticity,
ξt / It−1 =
ηtζt
εt
/It−1 → N(0,Ωt) (2.8)
where Ω is a 3 × 3 positive-definitive variance-covariance matrix. The conditional het-
eroskedasticity of ξt relaxes the more restrictive assumption of constant conditional second
moments and captures temporary changes in the volatility of structural shocks.
The unemployment level targeted by the central banker is proportional to the natural
rate value according to
u∗t = kEt−1unt for 0 < k ≤ 1 (2.9)
Applying a first-order Taylor series expansion to linearize this first-order condition,
after some small algebra involving (2.2), (2.4) and (2.5), and using the fact that it =
Et−1[it], one arrives at the two key econometric equations given by




(1− It) rπt + (1− λπb ) Itrπt + eut (2.10)
where σ2u,t is the conditional variance of unemployment based on the information at time
t, rπt (= πt = πrt ) denotes the final revisions of inflation, a = π∗, b = φµ(1 − k) ≥ 0,
c = φµγ2 ≤, and eut is a reduced form disturbance, and
∆ut = ψ−(1−δ)ut−1 +θ∆ut−1 +ζt+ηt−µεt+δ(µεt−1−ηt−1)+θ(µ∆εt−1−∆ηt−1) (2.11)
Equations (2.10) and (2.11) are an extension of the system of equations estimated
by Ruge-Murcia (2003b, 2004). Indeed, when λπj = 1 for all j = g, b - indicating that
policy monitoring focuses only on revised inflation - equation (2.10) becomes equations
(3.1) in Ruge-Murcia (2003b). Stationary and nonstationary versions of the model can be
investigated by placing different restrictions on δ. When δ = 1, equation (2.11) implies
that ut is an ARIMA(1,1,2) process, while for δ < 1, ut is an ARIMA(2,0,2) process.
The coefficients associated with the conditional expectations of unemployment and
the conditional unemployment volatility - b = φµ(1 − k) and c = φµγ2 , respectively - are
functions of deep model parameters characterizing central bank preferences (φ, k and γ)
and the slope. of the Phillips curve, µ. Since φ and µ are positive parameters, the sign
of c perfectly identifies the sign of γ - the asymmetric shape of central banker preferences
regarding deviations in unemployment from its target. Similarly, the sign of b perfectly
identifies the presence of surprise inflation à la Barro and Gordon (1983) featured by a
k 6= 1.
Following similar reasoning, the output-inflation asymmetric preference model sug-
gested in Cassou et al. (2012) can be extended to obtain the following bivariate system
which enables the presence of an inflation bias due to inflation revisions to be assessed
further:




(1− It) rπt + (1− λπb ) Itrπt + eY t (2.12)
∆Yt = ψ′+(1−δ)2t−(1−δ)Yt−1+θ∆Yt−1+ζt+ηt+µεt−δ(µεt−1+ηt−1)−θ(µ∆εt−1+∆ηt−1)
(2.13)
where Yt is output produced at time t, σ2Y,t is the conditional variance of output at time t,
and µ, ηt and ζt now interpret the slope of the supply curve, the supply curve disturbance
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term and the potential output process disturbance term, respectively. Equation (2.12) is a
special case of the inflation equation derived in Cassou et al. (2016), which considered the
possibility of real-time output monitoring in addition to real-time inflation monitoring. In
this paper we have decided to ignore real-time output monitoring and focus on only revised
output for various reasons: It enables us to focus only on the inflation bias resulting from
a central banker wishing to monitor real-time inflation. This focus is rationalized because
the central banker in our model is able to exercise direct control over inflation, whereas its
control over output (unemployment) is exercised indirectly through the aggregate supply
(Phillips curve) in the inflation-output (inflation-unemployment) model. It also enables a
more straightforward comparison to be made with the extended unemployment-inflation
model, where unemployment revisions are ignored since they are small and mostly due to
seasonal statistical adjustments, as emphasized above. Furthermore, the possibility that
output revisions may behave differently depending on whether the economy is performing
well or bad as suggested in Cassou et al. (2016) might be hard to distinguish from a central
banker preference asymmetry à la Ruge-Murcia (2003b, 2004). In short, the presence of
two type of asymmetry associated with deviations in output from its target can be difficult
to identify separately.
We now describe the econometric strategy followed in this paper to estimate the bi-
variate models (2.10)-(2.11) and (2.12)-(2.13), and then discuss the empirical results.
2.4 Estimation strategy and empirical results
This section discusses the estimation approach considered and the empirical results.
To keep things organized and clear, we have broken the section down into six subsections:
the first describes the sources of the data. The second subsection studies the inflation
revision series. Here, among other things, we show that inflation revisions processes are
predictable. As noted by Croushore (2011) and emphasized above, this is a necessary
condition for real-time data to have an effect on policy decision making. Third, we re-
port tests results providing support for conditional volatility in both the unemployment
and output time series for the US and the UK, which is a necessary condition for having
asymmetric central bank preferences à la Ruge-Murcia. Fourth, we address the issue of
estimating an unobservable unemployment threshold. Fifth, we show the (CML) estima-
tion results of the two bivariate empirical models given by equations (2.10) and (2.11) and
equations (2.12) and (2.13) for the two countries. The last subsection shows two tests for
further assessment of real-time inflation monitoring.
2.4.1 Data
To estimate the two empirical models revised and real-time data for inflation are
needed as well as data for the unemployment rate and output. The US revised data
used here include, the quarterly GDP deflator, the unemployment rate and Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP). These series were obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic
Data (FRED) base maintained by the ST. Louis Federal Reserve Bank. The real-time
GDP deflator time series was obtained from the real-time data bank maintained by the
Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank (Croushore and Stark 2001).
UK revised data were taken from the OECD database and the real-time UK GDP
deflator time series was taken from the OECD time database. Because the models require
inflation rates rather than price indexes, the inflation rates were obtained as the first
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difference of the log of the GDP deflator, which was then multiplied by 4 to obtain
annualized rates.
Table 2.1: Estimation of inflation revision processes
Countries US UK
linear non-linear linear non-linear
Estimated threshold 7.4 2.7
Constant-low unemp. 0.398*** 0.494*** 2.14*** 5.837***
(0.103) (0.117) (0.482) (1.041)
Constant-high unemp. 0.137 0.871*
(0.205) (0.537)




Real-time π low unemp. -0.084*** -0.12*** -0.332*** -0.583***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.06) (0.083)
Real-time π high unemp. 0.009 -0.15**
(0.046) (0.079)
F statistic 3.29 8.72
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
The sample periods considered for the two countries in our empirical analysis are
determined by the availability of real-time inflation data. Thus, we consider US data
from the first quarter of 1866 and UK data from the first quarter of 1968. Although
data that is called revised data was available up to 2017:1 when we started to carry out
our empirical analysis, the earlier end data for the long sample was chosen so as to be
consistent with the timing of the last revisions for the data, ignoring any comprehensive
or benchmark revisions that may be carried out in the future. In particular, there are
three-year lag before GDP and the GDP deflator are revised for the last time. This lag
means that only the data up to 2013:4 can be considered as truly revised data.
As emphasized above, having predictable inflation revision processes is a necessary
condition for real-time data affecting policy decision making. Hence, we now study the
features of inflation revision processes.
2.4.2 Properties of inflation revision processes
Before estimating the empirical models, we carried out a preliminary analysis of the
inflation revisions processes for the US and the UK in order to determine (i) whether
revisions of inflation are white noise; and (ii) whether inflation revisions processes look
different depending on whether the economy is doing well or not. This analysis is im-
portant because if revisions are unpredictable then, as noted in Croushore (2011) and
elsewhere, the distinction between real-time and revised inflation data would not be an
issue as long as revisions are not large.
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For the US and the UK, we estimate linear and nonlinear models of inflation revi-
sions. The estimated linear model is an AR(4) augmented with real-time inflation as an
explanatory variable:





t−k + ψπrt + ut (2.14)
Using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) as a guide we choose the best linear
model. For the US the best fitting model implies that βk = 0 for all k, whereas for the UK
the best fitting model is an AR(1) augmented with real-time inflation. Based on these
linear models, we estimate a threshold model augmented with real-time inflation as an
explanatory variable:
rπt = β0It + β1Itrπt−1 + ψItπrt + β′0(1− It) + β′1(1− It)rπt−1 + ψ′(1− It)πrt + εt (2.15)
where we assume that It is a dummy indicating the strength of the economy at period
t given by (2.6). The threshold, uT , is endogenously chosen so as to obtain the best fit.
Moreover, in line with the best fitting linear model, we assume β1 = β′1 = 0 for the US.
Table 2.1 shows the results of this investigation into whether the various revisions
processes are predictable. In order to save space, the estimates of the linear model coeffi-
cients are displayed in the same row as the coefficients of the nonlinear model associated
with low unemployment rate periods -i.e. It = 0. Table 2.1 shows that the coefficients
of real-time inflation are highly significant in the two countries.Moreover, the first-lag of
inflation revisions is also significant in the UK, The nonlinear model basically reproduces
the results of the linear model when the unemployment rate is below its threshold. How-
ever, inflation revisions behave rather differently when the unemployment rate is above
its threshold. Thus, US inflation revisions do not display any structure -all coefficients
are non-significant-, which suggests that real-time inflation is a rational predictor of re-
vised inflation in high unemployment periods. In contrast, UK real-time inflation also
marginally anticipates inflation revisions when the unemployment rate is high.
Table 2.2: LM tests for neglected ARCH
Panel A: Unemployment
No. of lags
Squared residuals Country 1 2 3 4 5 6
Original US 15.89*** 23.31*** 23.65*** 23.62*** 23.48*** 23.6***
UK 15.77*** 16.52*** 16.46*** 16.34*** 16.36*** 17.72***
Standardized US 0.14 0.3 0.36 0.53 3.07 8.49
UK 0.62 0.9 0.9 1.11 2.78 5.31
Panel B: Output
No. of lags
Squared residuals Country 1 2 3 4 5 6
Original US 1.34 6.23** 6.15 9.93** 10.79* 10.85*
UK 15.6*** 17.37*** 20.82*** 20.62*** 20.99*** 21.74***
Standardized US 0.51 0.6 0.6 0.94 2.45 3.39
UK 1.45 2.16 2.17 2.22 2.11 3.17
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
The test to determine whether this model fits no better than the linear model, as indi-
cated by the row labeled F -statistic, has an F -statistic of 3.290 for the US, which is lower
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than the 10% critical value of 4.706, so this null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Notice
that these test results are somewhat in contrast with the different estimated coefficients of
real-time inflation found above and below the unemployment threshold.7 For the UK, the
F -statistic is 8.735, which is above the 5% critical values of 4.419, so the null hypothesis
is easily rejected.
There are two issues associated with the estimation of the inflation-unemployment
model and the inflation-output model given by equations (2.10) and (2.11) and equations
(2.12) and (2.13), respectively. First, the conditional variances entering into the inflation
equations in the two models -equations (2.10) and (2.12) - are hard to identify for two
reasons. Namely, they are identified only if they are not constant. Moreover, they cannot
be observed directly, so they have to be estimated. Second, the unemployment threshold
defined in (2.6) cannot be observed directly either. These two issues are addressed below.
2.4.3 Conditional volatility of output and unemployment
Following Ruge-Murcia (2003b) and others, we first perform neglected ARH tests to
check whether there is conditional volatility in both the unemployment and output time
series. Here the residuals from a four-lag VAR -a time trend is also included in the case
of output -were collected. These residuals were then squared and an regression was run
on a constant and one to six lags. These test statistics have χ21 distribution, where q is
the number of lags.
Then, the two conditional variances -σ2u,t and σ2Y,t - were estimated using a parsimonious
(1,1) model. Following the line of argument in Pagan and Ullah (1988) and Ruge-Murcia
(2003b), if we wish to use these estimates as generated regressors in equations (2.10)
and (2.12), we first have to verify that the ARCH model chosen is correctly specified.
A standard misspecification test for ARCH models is the LM test for neglected ARCH
described above, but applied to the standardized squared residuals -i.e. the residuals
corrected for heteroskedasticity. That is, if the ARCH model is correctly specified, then
the standardized squared residuals must be serially uncorrelated.
Table 2.2 contains the results of various neglected ARCH tests. This table is broken
down into two panel (Panels A and B), which show the results for unemployment and
output series, respectively. In each panel, the first two rows show the results using the
original series for the US and the. UK. The last two rows show the results using the
standardized residuals from the Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity
model (GARCH)(1,1) model for the two countries. Theses results show evidence that the
original unemployment an output series do have conditional heteroskedasticity, while the
two conditional variance series do not.
We now examine the issue of estimating the unemployment threshold.
2.4.4 Unobservable unemployment threshold
To address the issue of dealing with an unobservable unemployment threshold, we first
estimate each of the two models for alternative values of the unemployment threshold using
a constrained maximum likelihood (CML ) procedure on a predefined grid interval for
7The critical values do not come from a conventional F distribution table. We computed the critical
values by using the bootstrap simulation procedure describe in Hansen (1997), which showed that the
F -statistics in TR models do not have standard F distributions and that. proper critical values can be
found using a bootstrap procedure.
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each country. The model specification with the largest log-likelihood value thus provides
the estimated unemployment threshold and the remaining parameter estimates. The
threshold unemployment grid intervals considered for the US and the UK are defined by
the vectors (6.2, 7.8, 0.1) and (6.5, 8.5, 0.1), respectively, where the first two components
denote the lower and upper bounds.
2.4.5 Empirical results
Table 2.3: CML estimation results
Countries US UK
Unemployment Output Unemployment Output
Threshold 7.4 7.4 7.3 8.4
Bad times/total 48/184 48/183 51/174 37/175
a 3.193*** 1.909*** 5.108*** 3.139***
(0.207) (0.178) (0.58) (0.42)
c 5.421*** 2.628*** 2.542** 2.767***
(2.057) (0.326) (1.525) (0.469)
λπg 1 1 0.441*** 0.565***
- - (0.136) (0.084)
λπb 0.047 0 0.563*** 0.392***
(0.402) - (0.103) (0.106)
Log-likelihood -424.852 259.68 -464.793 77.238
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively. Standard errors of estimated parameters of λπj reaching corner points cannot be reported.
This subsection discusses the empirical results. In order to simplify the exposition,
we focus our discussion on the empirical results for the case of δ = 1. Thus, equations
(2.11) and (2.13) imply that ut and Yt are both ARIMA(1,1,2) processes.8 Table 2.3
shows the maximum likelihood estimation results of the unemployment-inflation and the
output-inflation models for the US (left panel) and the UK (right panel). In each panel,
unemployment model results are displayed in the left column and output model results
in the right column. The first row of Table 2.3 shows the unemployment thresholds that
maximize the log-likelihood function in each case. Interestingly, the estimated unemploy-
ment threshold is the same at 7.4 in the two models for the US. However, for the UK the
estimated threshold of the unemployment rate is higher (8.4) in the output model than
in the unemployment model (7.3), which is similar to the estimated value in the US.
Several noteworthy conclusions emerge from Table 2.3.9 Namely, the two models
provide evidence of a strong asymmetric Fed monitoring of real-time inflation depending
8Similar results are found if δ < 1 is assumed, i.e. if equations (2.11) and (2.13) imply that ut and
Yt are both ARIMA(2,0,2) processes. Estimation results under the alternative assumption are available
from the authors upon request.
9Preliminary CML estimates ob the bivariate models (2.10)-(2.11) and (2.12)-(2.13) always result in
a corner estimate b = 0, which implies k = 1, indicating the absence of surprise inflation à la citebarro.
Hence, we do not report the corner estimate b = 0 in Table 2.3.
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on the state of the economy. Thus, the corner estimates of λπg = 1 suggest that the Fed
only monitors revised inflation during “good economic times” when unemployment is low.
However, the Fed focuses only on real-time inflation, λπb ≈ 0, when unemployment is high
-i.e. above the estimated unemployment rate threshold. The finding that the Federal
Reserve mainly focuses on real-time inflation during “bad economic times” may reflect
the need to react quickly to the initial announcements of inflation in these periods due to
poltical pressures, but may also reflect the fact that real-time inflation data is a less noisy
predictor of revised inflation in high-unemployment periods than in low-unemployment
periods, as shown in Table 2.1 above.
In contrast to the US, the estimated inflation weights for the UK indicate that the
Bank of England uses a roughly equally-weighted-average of revised and real-time inflation
when monitoring inflation-that is λπg ≈ λπb ≈ 0.5. Moreover, this feature is fairly robust
across the two bivariate models in the UK. The absence of asymmetric monitoring in the
case of the Bank of England is also in line with the absence of a non-linear patter in UK
inflation revisions, as shown in Table 2.1.
The estimated positive value of c also provides additional support for the findings in
Ruge-Murcia (2003b), Cassou et al. (2012) and Cassou and Vázquez (2014), supporting the
hypothesis that the Federal Reserve takes stronger action when the rate of unemployment
(output) is above (below) its natural rate (potential level) than when it is below (above).
in the case of the Bank of England, the significance of c is somewhat sensitive across
models. Thus, the null hypothesis c = 0 is weakly rejected at the 10% significance level
in the unemployment model, which is in line with the findings in Ruge-Murcia (2004).
However, this null hypothesis is strongly rejected in the output model, which provides
evidence that the Bank of England takes stronger action when output is below its potential
level than when it is above.
We now formally test the hypothesis of real-time inflation monitoring for the two
central banks.
2.4.6 Tests of real-time inflation monitoring
Although estimation results suggest that λπg 6= λπb for the US and λπg = λπb for the UK,
a formal test of the null hypothesis λπg = λπb can be rather cumbersome in the contest
of the bivariate models and the CML estimation approach followed above because the
conventional critical values are not useful when the threshold is estimated. Fortunately,
this test can be easily implemented in our estimated model because the CML estimates
imply that b = 0. Hence, we can use ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the single-
equation models (2.10) and (2.12) by imposing b = 0:




(1− It)rπt + (1− λπb )Itrπt + eut (2.16)




(1− It)rπt + (1− λπb )Itrπt + eY t (2.17)
and considering the estimated threshold values obtained from the CML of the bivariate
models. Similarly, a test of the (un)importance of inflation revisions (i.e. Ho : λπg = λπb =
1) can be implemented.
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Table 2.4: OLS estimation results
Countries US UK
Unemployment Output Unemployment Output
Threshold 7.4 7.4 7.3 8.4
Bad times/total 48/184 48/184 51/176 37/176
a 3.233*** 1.894*** 4.796*** 3.210***
(0.227) (0.219) (0.632) (0.386)
c 5.171*** 2.684*** 3.807* 2.696***
(1.960) (0.261) (1.955) (0.240)
1− λπg 0.020 -0.071 0.504** 0.600***
(0.240) (0.194) (0.211) (0.197)
1− λπb 0.746* 1.033*** 0.555*** 0.438***
(0.407) (0.326) (0.085) (0.063)
F-stat: λπg = λπb 2.387 8.509 0.052 0.607
[6.404,10%] [7.959,5%] [6.134,10%] [6.092,10%]
F-stat: λπg = λπb = 1 1.682 5.096 24.435 28.789
[4.044,10%] [4.899,5%] [6.754,1%] [6.714,1%]
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% lev-
els, respectively. Each term in brackets below the F -statistics contains two entries: the first indicates
the critical value obtained using Hansen (1997) bootstrapping procedure whereas the second shows the
associated significance level.
Table 2.4 shows the estimation results of the two univariate models of inflation (2.16)
and (2.17) for the two countries. A comparison of Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 shows that the
two econometric approaches lead to rather robust results. The test of the null hypothesis
λπg = λπb , as indicated by the row labeled F -statistic: λπg = λπb in Table 2.4, shows an F -
statistic of 2.387 for the US using the univariate model (2.16), which is lower than the 10%
critical value of 6.404, implying that the null hypothesis of symmetry cannot be rejected.
Howerver, an F -statistic of 8.509 using the conditional variance of output as a regressor
in the model (2.17), which is larger than the 5% critical value of 7.959, indicates that the
threshold model clearly fits better than the linear model.10 Furthermore, the low values
of the F -statistics for the two UK univariate models clearly indicate the non-rejection of
this null hypothesis.
A test of the hypothesis positing the absence of inflation bias due to inflation data
revisions: λπg = λπb = 1, as indicated by the row labeled F -statistic: λπg = λπb = 1 in
Table 2.4, shows that this null hypothesis cannot be rejected at any standard significance
level for the US using the univariate model (2.16). However, an F -statistic of 5.096 using
the conditional variance of output as a regressor in the model (2.17), which is larger than
te 5% critical value of 4.899, suggests the presence of inflation bias due to inflation data
revisions. The evidence against the null hypothesis λπg = λπb = 1 is much stronger for the
UK.
10Again, critical values are computed using Hansen (1997) bootstrapping procedure.
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2.5 Analysis of other Central Banks
We extend the analysis to a larger number of countries. Specifically, we include two Eu-
ropean countries that are outside the European Monetary Union: Sweden and Denmark;
and three non-european countries: Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The revised in-
flation and output data series of the counties included in this extension were taken from
the OECD database and the real-time deflator time series was taken from the OECD
time database. Because the models require inflation rates rather than price indexes, the
inflation rates were obtained as the first difference of the log of the GDP deflator, which
was then multiplied by 4 to obtain annualized rates. The sample periods for each country
are determined by the availability of real-time inflation data. The starting period for
Denmark is the most recent period considered, starting at the third-quarter of 1995, and
therefore is the smallest sample included in this analysis. All the data is considered up
to 2013:4 in order to have truly revised data. Table 2.5 shows the main results obtained
for those six countries.
Table 2.5: Summary of the main results
Countries Non-linear Heterosked. Sym. targeting Hyp. no RT
revisions in good and bad times targeting
Australia Yes Output model Not rejected Rejected
Switzerland Yes Output model Not rejected Rejected
Canada Yes Unemp. model Not rejected Rejected
New Zealand Yes Output model Not rejected Rejected
Sweden No Output model Not rejected Not rejected
Denmark Yes None Rejected Rejected
As shown in the summary Table 2.5 of the main results of the extended empirical
analysis, the absence of real-time data targeting is rejected for all countries but for Swe-
den. The revisions of Sweden seem not to display a non-linearity and this can be the
source of the finding of no real-time data inclusion in the decision making of the Swedish
Central Bank policy. However, the rest of the countries of our analysis seem to take into
account real-time data targeting in good or/and bad economic times in their decision
making process. In order to distinguish furthermore the sources of those differences in
the targeting rules of the Central Banks we will discuss the steps of the analysis more in
deep in the next lines.
Table A.1 shows the results of the analysis of the predictability of the revisions pro-
cesses for each country. As mentioned above, in order to save space the estimates of the
linear model coefficients are displayed in the same row as the coefficients of the nonlinear
model associated with low unemployment rate periods -i.e. when the dummy is It = 0.
Table A.1 shows that the coefficients of real-time inflation are highly significant in all the
countries. The first-lag of inflation revision is also significant for Australia, New Zealand,
Canada and Denmark, as happened for UK. Therefore, we conclude that the distinction
of real-time and revised inflation data for those countries is crucial. The test to determine
whether this model fits no better than the linear model, as indicated by the row labeled
F -statistic, shows that with a F -statistic of lower than the 10% critical value of 4.706,
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this null hypothesis cannot be rejected for Australia, New Zealand, Sweden and Denmark.
However, it seems that we cannot reject this hypothesis for Canada.
Table A.2 displays the results for the LM test. Maintaining the structure of the
previous analysis, the table is divided in two Panels: Panel A above shows the results from
the unemployment model and Panel B from the output model. Each Panel is divided in
two sections. The first five rows show the results using the original series for each country.
The last five rows of each panel show the results using the standardized residuals from the
GARCH(1,1) model. These results show evidence that the original unemployment series
shows heteroskedasticity in Canada. However, the output series show heteroskedasticity
for the rest of the countries: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Sweden and Denmark.
As for US and UK we estimate the unobservable unemployment threshold using a
CML procedure on a grid interval for each country. The model specification with the
largest log-likelihood values is chosen as the unemployment threshold and the remaining
parameters. Table A.3 shows the results for this analysis. It is divided in two panels, above
the results from the output analysis and below the results from the unemployment model.
The two models provide evidence of a strong asymmetric monitoring of real-time inflation
depending on the state of the economy in Australia in New Zealand. In contrast to these
results, the Central Banks of Canada, Denmark and Sweden seems to put more weight
in the targeting of revised data independently of the state of the economy. However, as
happened for the UK, there is evidence of an equally-weighted average of real-time and
revised inflation targeting for Sweden during the business cycle. The Bank of Canada
and the National Bank of Denmark seem to put more weight on real-time data targeting
during good times and it only targets revised data during bad economic times. Those
results are consistent in both specifications of the model.
Comparing Table A.3 and Table A.4 leads to rather robust results. The test of the
null hypothesis of symmetric inflation targeting, indicated by the row labeled F -statistic:
λπg = λπb , cannot be rejected for Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Sweden. However,
Denmark with a F -statistic of 14.658, which is larger than the 1% critical value of 12.055,
indicates that the threshold model clearly fits better than the linear model. The results
of the test of the absence of inflation bias due to inflation data revisions, shown in the
row labeled F -statistic: λπg = λπb = 1, with a F -statistic larger than the 1% critical value,
suggest that there is real-time inflation targeting in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and
Denmark. The null hypothesis of non real-time inflation targeting cannot be reject for
Sweden with a F -statistic of 1.213 using the conditional variance of output as a regressor
in the model (2.17), which is lower than te 10% critical value of 4.096. The results
are robust under the two univariate models of inflation (2.16) and (2.17) for the all the
countries.
These results suggest that the importance of real-time inflation monitoring may reflect
whether the inflation revisions are well behaved (i.e. whether real-time inflation is a
rational forecast of revised inflation). As we have seen, for the US, Australia and New
Zealand, the importance of real-time inflation monitoring increases in bad times (i.e. when
the rates of unemployment are high), which are characterized by well-behaved inflation
revisions (i.e. intercepts and lagged real-time inflation have no explanatory power on
inflation revisions). Meanwhile, inflation monitoring mainly focus on revised inflation in
good times (i.e. when the rates of unemployment are low) when inflation revisions are
not well behaved.
In contrast, inflation revisions in Canada behave better in good times than in bad
times. The estimation results of the Canadian inflation equation suggest that real-time
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inflation monitoring is more important in good times than in bad times, also providing
support to the hypothesis stated above. For Sweden, inflation revisions behaved poorly
both in good and bad times. Estimation results of the Swedish inflation equation show
that real-time inflation monitoring is not important at any time in this country, which
also supports the hypothesis.
Finally, the hypothesis cannot be tested for the two remaining countries in this analysis
(UK and Denmark). The reason is that the estimated thresholds of the unemployment
rate in the inflation revision equation and the inflation equation are very different to each
other in order to establish a relationship between the quality of inflation revisions and
real-time inflation monitoring. In order to test the hypothesis we re-estimate the CML
model using the thresholds that better define the revision processes in theses countries
(displayed in Table 2.1 and Table A.1).



























Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
Table 2.6 shows the results for UK and Denmark for both models, unemployment
and output, respectively. The estimation results provide evidence of a strong asymmet-
ric monitoring of real-time inflation depending on the state of the economy in UK and
Denmark. The Bank of England and the National Bank of Denmark mainly focus on
real-time inflation during “bad economic times” and they focus on mainly revised data
on good economic times. As happened for US, this may reflect a need to react quickly to
bad news. Thus, political pressures can also induce asymmetric central bank responses
to inflation in real-time decisions making. As a result, the importance of an inflation
bias induced from the differences between revised an real-time inflation data, as in the
traditional inflation bias sources suggested by Barro and Gordon (1983) and Ruge-Murcia
(2003b, 2004), is likely to be a consequence of the degree of central bank independence,
which can differ from country to country.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper adds to the growing body of literature on monetary policy and real-time
data analysis. Here, we show how to extend the Ruge-Murcia (2003b) type of asymmet-
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ric monetary planning models to study real-time issues faced by a central banker. By
assuming that the central banker aims at monitoring a weighted average of both revised
and real-time inflation data, our model identifies another source of inflation bias due to
inflation revisions in addition to that featured by asymmetric central bank preferences
as suggested by Ruge-Murcia (2003b). This analysis is implemented by estimating two
parallel models. In one case, we estimate a bivariate inflation-unemployment model and
in the other we estimate a bivariate inflation-output model.
The two models are estimated by implementing a constrained maximum likelihood
procedure and considering several countries data. Our empirical results suggest that the
Federal Reserve focuses only on monitoring revised inflation during low unemployment
periods, but focuses heavily on real-time inflation during high unemployment periods,
inducing an important source of inflation bias. This asymmetric attention in regards
to real-time inflation may be related to the long lags associated with the final revised
inflation releases and pundits or public opinion. The Reserve Banks of Australia and New
Zealand seems to follow closely the targeting policy of the Fed, but they also consider
revised data when the unemployment is high.
In contrast to these findings, the Bank of England seems to use a roughly equally-
weighted-average of real-time and revised inflation when monitoring the deviations of this
average from its inflation target. The Central Banks of Canada and Denmark however,
seem to weight less more heavily revised data during bad economic times. However, when
the economy is doing well they seem to put more weight on real-time inflation targeting.
On the other hand, the results for Sweden suggest an absence of real-time data targeting.
Moreover, the empirical results in the US show that the inflation bias induced by asym-
metric central banker preferences in our augmented model with data revisions remains
significant. However, this empirical evidence is not as clear-cut in the UK. Overall, these
results reinforce those found by Ruge-Murcia (2003b, 2004) using revised unemployment
and inflation data and by Cassou et al. (2012) using output and inflation data.
Our analysis also tentatively suggests a relationship between the quality of the initial
announcements of inflation as a predictor of final revised inflation and the weight given
to real-time inflation in the policy function. Thus, US, Australia and New Zealand seem
to focus only on real-time inflation during bad economic times, but also when real-time
inflation is a rational predictor of inflation. However, the Central Bank of Sweden seems
to focus only on revised inflation, as real-time inflation seems not to be a rational pre-
dictor of revised inflation. For the rest of the countries, UK and Denmark, the empirical
evidence -including a threshold that better characterizes the revision processes- supports
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Real-time π low unemp. -0.311*** -0.332***
(0.043) (0.045)














Real-time π low unemp. -0.363*** -0.363***
(0.072) (0.073)














Real-time π low unemp. -0.245*** -0.16***
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Real-time π low unemp. -0.987*** -0.988***
(0.028) (0.03)














Real-time π low unemp. -0.525*** -0.549***
(0.092) (0.097)




Table A.2: LM Tests for neglected ARCH
Panel A: Unemployment
No. of lags
Squared residuals Country 1 2 3 4 5 6
Original AUSTRALIA 1.66 1.9 1.87 5.19 5.91 6.45
NEWZEALAND 1.02 2.92 5.16 5.15 8.84 8.2
CANADA 4.55** 5.34* 7.41* 7.51 7.44 7.53
SWEDEN 2.17 3.14 3.47 3.61 3.7 3.89
DENMARK 0.01 0.17 3.27 3.47 3.82 3.66
Standardized AUSTRALIA - - - - - -
NEWZEALAND - - - - - -
CANADA 0.39 1.15 1.24 3.8 3.87 8.52
SWEDEN - - - - - -
DENMARK - - - - - -
Panel B: Output
No. of lags
Squared residuals Country 1 2 3 4 5 6
Original AUSTRALIA 3.27* 5.31* 9.07** 9.79** 11.08** 11.11*
NEWZEALAND 1.71 0.47 2.45 2.37 5.22 29.68***
CANADA 1.37 1.47 2.61 1.95 2.26 2.44
SWEDEN 0.27 1.58 13.39*** 13.27** 12.98** 14.64**
DENMARK 0.04 0.14 1.54 2.01 2.42 2.39
Standardized AUSTRALIA 0.18 0.74 0.52 1.7 1.75 1.75
NEWZEALAND 0 0.01 0.71 1.15 1.39 2.41
CANADA - - - - - -
SWEDEN 0.02 0.87 2.83 2.79 2.99 3.26
DENMARK - - - - - -
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Table A.3: CML estimation results
Panel: Output
Countries AUSTRALIA NEWZEALAND CANADA SWEDEN DENMARK
Threshold 7.4 7.3 10.4 9.1 5.7
Bad times/total 55/182 21/90 21/122 7/74 22/66
a 1.114** 2.087*** 2.402*** 1.553*** 1.862***
(0.512) (0.357) (0.263) (0.245) (0.234)
c 5.239*** 0 0 0 0
(0.627) - (0) (0) (0)
λπg 0.775*** 0.619*** 0.548*** 0.951*** 0.379***
(0.102) (0.169) (0.219) (0.024) (0.089)
λπb 0.35*** 0.217* 0.92*** 0.838*** 1
(0.135) (0.138) (0.321) (0.077) -
Log-likelihood 81.066 45.512 154.435 -155.985 -144.812
Panel: Unemployment
Countries AUSTRALIA NEWZEALAND CANADA SWEDEN DENMARK
Threshold 6.9 8 9.5 10.2 5.7
Bad times/total 61/182 17/94 36/122 2/74 22/66
a 5.477*** 2.06*** 2.394*** 1.171* 1.862***
(0.351) (0.346) (0.257) (0.872) (0.234)
c 0 0 0 5.613 0
(0) (0) - (15.07) (0)
λπg 0.804*** 0.626*** 0.463** 0.961*** 0.379***
(0.128) (0.159) (0.247) (0.027) (0.089)
λπb 0.28** 0.068 0.913*** 0.774*** 1
(0.149) (0.145) (0.176) (0.064) -
Log-likelihood -563.63 -275.577 -305.023 -159.046 -144.812
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Table A.4: OLS estimation results
Panel: Output
Countries AUSTRALIA NEWZEALAND CANADA SWEDEN DENMARK
Threshold 7.4 7.3 10.4 9.1 5.7
Bad times/total 55/182 20/90 20/122 7/74 22/66
a 1.155** 3.283 2.349*** 2.123*** 1.887***
(0.554) (4.2) (0.256) (0.732) (0.244)
c 5.198*** -13.076 0 -0.806 0
(0.57) (45.375) (0) (0.908) (0)
1− λπg 0.24*** 0.358*** 0.529*** 0.041* 0.627***
(0.085) (0.14) (0.171) (0.028) (0.123)
1− λπb 0.703*** 0.843*** 0.249 0.063 -0.214
(0.194) (0.281) (0.28) (0.188) (0.184)
F-stat: λπg = λπb 4.782 2.353 0.737 0.014 14.658
[6.261,10%] [6.183,10%] [5.914,10%] [6.416,10%] [12.055,1%]
F-stat: λπg = λπb = 1 10.665 8.123 5.235 1.213 14.175
[6.81,1%] [6.988,1%] [6.526,1%] [4.096,10%] [7.222,1%]
Panel: Unemployment
Countries AUSTRALIA NEWZEALAND CANADA SWEDEN DENMARK
Threshold 6.9 8 9.5 10.2 5.7
Bad times/total 61/182 17/94 35/122 2/74 22/66
a 5.474*** 2.062*** 2.394*** 1.458*** 1.887***
(0.351) (0.364) (0.286) (0.237) (0.244)
c 0 0 -303.796 0 0
(0) (0) (1107.753) (0) (0)
1− λπg 0.214** 0.375*** 0.586*** 0.042* 0.627***
(0.104) (0.133) (0.18) (0.027) (0.123)
1− λπb 0.684*** 0.939*** 0.204 -24.405** -0.214
(0.219) (0.24) (0.249) (13.969) (0.184)
F-stat: λπg = λπb 3.751 4.222 1.572 3.063 14.658
[6.233,10%] [6.073,10%] [5.955,10%] [6.338,10%] [12.055,1%]
F-stat: λπg = λπb = 1 7.064 11.883 5.686 2.858 14.175
[6.756,1%] [6.792,1%] [6.587,1%] [4.03,10%] [7.222,1%]

Risk news, financial frictions and the
Spanish recession
“These senior claims were supposed to be very low-risk; after all, how likely
was it that a large number of people would default on their mortgages at the same
time? The answer, of course, is that it was quite likely in an environment where
homes were worth 30, 40, 50 percent less than the borrowers originally paid for
them. So a lot of supposedly safe assets, assets that had been rated AAA by
Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s, ended up becoming "toxic waste", worth only a
fraction of their face value.”
– Paul Krugman End This Depression Now!
3.1 Abstract
After the recent banking crisis in 2008, financial market conditions have turned out
to be a relevant factor for economic fluctuations. This paper provides a quantitative
assessment of the impact of financial frictions on the Spanish economy. We augment the
model of Christiano et al. (2010, 2014) to a small economy model with a banking sector
able to diversify portfolio choices between loans and risk-free German bonds (Bunds). Our
model also includes, the inflation differential between Spain and the European Monetary
Union (EMU) in order to quantify the influence of the implementation of the single
monetary policy in Spain. Our results show that anticipated risk shocks, measured as
the volatility of idiosyncratic uncertainty in the financial sector, are key in the evolution
of the economic crisis in Spain.
3.2 Introduction
The global financial crisis of 2007-2010 has underlined the need for researchers to
include and explicitly model the financial sector as a trigger and propagator of the financial
crisis. Moreover, it has drawn attention to the role of financial frictions as key mechanisms
to explain business fluctuations.
In this paper we present and evaluate a model that helps study the role of the finan-
cial sector in the Spanish liquidity trap. We find that the agency problems, the liquidity
constraints facing banks, risk shocks that hit financial intermediation and the ineffec-
tiveness of the single monetary policy are prime determinants of economic fluctuations.
Altogether, they have been critical triggers and propagators in the recent financial crisis.
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Our model is a variant of Christiano et al. (2010, 2014), we integrate a foreign sector
that supplies government bonds to the Spanish banks of the type studied by Moreno et al.
(2014). The real economy is made of households and firms. Households are composed by
workers, capital producers and entrepreneurs. The working households consume, supply
differentiated work in a monopolistic labour market, and allocate savings as deposits on
the bank. Capital producers combine undepreciated physical capital with new investment
subject to a shock in the investment efficiency process. Entrepreneurial households acquire
plant capacity from capital producers, extract production services from it, they resell the
stock of undepreciated capital at the end of the production period. Firms buy capital
production services from entrepreneurs and produce intermediate goods in a monopolist
market.
Entrepreneurs’ net worth is subject to a financial wealth shock and is used to pay
for capital in the next period. But, in order to run their activity, entrepreneurs need to
borrow a fraction of the value of capital which they are not able to self-finance through
their net worth. The bank provides the sources to finance entrepreneurs’ investment
projects using the deposits placed by households. They can also diversify their portfolio
investment having access to foreign sovereign debt (Bunds).
Idiosyncratic uncertainty in the financial sector has been introduced in DSGE models
by Bernanke et al. (1999). More recently, Christiano et al. (2010, 2014) make this idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty time-varying through risk shocks that modify the standard deviation of
idiosyncratic shocks to the productivity of private borrowers and lead to macroeconomic
fluctuations. By doing so, the authors provide a new transmission channel from uncer-
tainty to business cycles through financial frictions that we use in this paper. The model
also includes an inflation differential between Spain and the EMU. This differential helps
to analyze the effects of single-monetary policy and its effectiveness in Spain.
We estimate the model for Spain over the period 2000Q1-2017Q4. We use quarterly
observations of ten macroeconomic series that are commonly used in the estimation of
DSGE models and three financial series: credit to non financial corporations, the risk
premium of sovereign bonds and entrepreneurial net worth. First, we show that 52% of the
variability of output and 89% of the variability of credit in the business cycle is accounted
by anticipated risk shocks in the economy. Moreover, they explain the variations in the
stock market and the interest premium as well. These shocks explain the episode of credit
crunch and contraction of investment and output. Such a sequence has been observed
during the last crisis of 2007 in Spain which was anticipated by several economic agents.
Our results show that anticipated risk shocks dominate all the other shocks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.3 clarifies the empirical
motivation for our analysis. Section 3.4 discusses the related literature. Section 3.5
provides a brief summary of the model. The data used in our analysis and the empirical
results are discusses in section 3.6. Finally, section 3.7 concludes.
3.3 Motivation
The global financial crisis of 2007, originated by the sub-prime crisis in the US, had
a major impact worldwide. The influence on the Spanish economy has been deeper and
more long-lasting due to the state of the financial system when the crisis began.
With the establishment of the single currency in 2002, the exchange rate risk disap-
peared and Spain started to receive capital inflows from abroad. This produced a dramatic
fall in the Spanish interest rates. Figure 3.1 shows that the integration of Spain into the
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European Union led to a higher economic growth in Spain relative to the Euro Area (2.3
points on average). During this period of economic boom, credit flowed and created a
process of excessive indebtedness of public and private sectors and a high dependence
on credit to generate economic activity. As a consequence the Spanish inflation was on
average higher than the EMU’s inflation as shown in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.1: GDP growth rate compared to previous quarter between Spain and the EMU,
s.a.
Graph taken from Andrés et al. (2010)
Figure 3.2: Inflation differential between Spain and the EMU
Graph taken from Andrés et al. (2010)
At the time the financial crisis struck, Spain was vulnerable to monetary and financial
shocks. The Spanish economy entered into a recession and the number of firms that went
bankrupt rapidly escalated. As a result, the number of non-performing loans increased
dramatically during this period, as shown in Figure 3.3. With the increase in the number
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of non-performing loans, banks tightened their collateral constraints and started lending
less to the private sector as shown in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.3: Non-performing loans to the total gross loans (percentage)
Source: World Bank. Source Code: GFDD.SI.02.
Figure 3.4: Loans from Spain to Euro Area non-financial corporations (anual growth rate)
Graph taken from the Bank De France database
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Due to the increase in loan risk, the banks started allocating their investments to other
assets. As a consequence, the international demand for German bonds, rated as minimum
risky assets (AAA rating), increased as shown in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Billions of euros of German sovereign debt holding by nationals and non-
nationals
Graph taken from the Bruegel database
3.4 Related Literature
In the recent empirical macroeconomics literature, there are different approaches for
modelling the Spanish economy. Andrés et al. (2006) estimate a DSGE model developed
by the Spanish Central Bank (BdE) as two regions of the same EMU: Spain and the rest
of the Euro area. They include housing, as a durable good, and the level of disaggregation
for each region is adjusted to the Quarterly National Accounts (QNA). They show that the
shocks differ in magnitude in Spain and in the rest of the Euro Area having higher effects
on the Spanish macroeconomic variables including inflation. As a consequence, Spain
will face more difficulties in fulfilling the Maastricht inflation criterium. More recently,
Boscá et al. (2010) present a Rational Expectations Model for the Spanish economy
(REMS model). This is a small open economy model that incorporates financial frictions.
Specifically, they include adjustment costs in consumption and investment. They estimate
this rational expectation DSGE model using Bayesian techniques. Their results show
that this models helps better understanding the effects of several policies on the Spanish
economy, but it falls short in explaining the recent crisis. Boscá et al. (2015) modelled a
specific financial sector for the Spanish economy. They estimate a small open economy
model of Spain in a currency union. The model can be used to evaluate ex-ante and
ex-post policies, structural reforms and to decompose the evolution of macroeconomic
aggregates according to different shocks. In contrast, our model includes signals on risk
shock that helps explain better the linkages between the financial and real sectors in the
Spanish economy during the recent financial crisis.
Recent studies show different approaches to include the contribution of anticipated
shocks in explaining the business cycles. There is a widespread belief that changes in
expectations may be an important independent driver of economic fluctuations. The
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news view of business cycles offers a formalization of this perspective. Our paper relates
to a few strands of the literature investigating these macroeconomic phenomena using
Bayesian estimation of DSGE models. We find that anticipated shocks account for about
52% of the predicted fluctuations in output whereas the unanticipated shocks do not have
any explanatory power. Also, they account for 100% of the variation in the risk premium.
Recently, Beaudry and Portier (2007); Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012) estimate a
DSGE model where forward-looking agents react to anticipated technological changes.
They show that these anticipated shocks account for half of the aggregate fluctuations
in output, consumption, employment and investment over the business cycle. Fujiwara
et al. (2011) estimate a DSGE model using Bayesian methods. They show that in the
United States the news shock with a longer forecast horizon has a larger effect on nominal
variables. Another approach analyzed in the literature by Beaudry and Portier (2004),
is the effect of agents-forecasting the economy’s future needs in term of capital. Their
results show that a model that includes agents having difficulties forecasting the future
helps better understanding the recent US recession.
In our model, we also analyze the effect of the single monetary policy has on Spain.
With the establishment of the Euro Zone in 1999, Spain lost the ability to conduct inde-
pendently its monetary policy and handed over this power to the European Central Bank.
The recent crisis had different effects across the European Monetary Union (EMU) due to
the different institutional features (e.g. labor market institutions). Several authors have
analyzed the inconveniences and inequalities that a single monetary policy has across the
EMU member countries. Canzoneri et al. (1996) analyze the inflation differentials between
the EMUcountries. Their results show that countries like Spain and Italy face more diffi-
culties into fulfilling the Maastricht convergence criteria due to the different productivity
trends. In particular, the different productivity trends have generated higher inflation in
Spain than in other countries as Germany. Sinn and Reutter (2001) analyze the changes
in price and show that a common monetary policy that stabilises the prices in all EMU
countries is not feasible due to structural differences across countries. Gomez-Gonzalez
and Rees (2018) go a step beyond, and analyze the hypothetical case of the performance
of Spain if it would have retained an independent monetary policy. They show that the
Spanish economic growth would have been 0.8 points higher during the first years of the
crisis but that the economic activity would have slowed down by the late 2016, following
the global trend. Our results show that the inflation differential between Spain and the
EMU can account for 11% of the variability of output and 63% of the variability on the
interest rates.
3.5 The Model
This section provides a brief overview of the model.1 The model includes households,
intermediate good firms, final good firms, a government, a bank and a foreign unlimited
supplier of risk-free assets2. The households are composed by workers, capital producers
and entrepreneurs.
The model belongs to the class of DSGE models with real and nominal rigidities
developed by Smets and Wouters (2003) augmented to include a financial accelerator
1The detailed maximization and conditions that the agents face are available upon request from the
author.
2Think of German short-term bongs as risk-free foreign bonds for Spanish banks.
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mechanism à la Bernanke et al. (1999).
Households are composed by workers, capital producers and entrepreneurs. At the
beginning of the period the households make their optimal choices: provide deposits to
the bank, supply labor to the intermediate good firms and consume. Prices and wages
are subject to nominal rigidities à la Calvo. Monopoly suppliers of labor and of interme-
diate goods can reoptimize their wage and price, respectively, only periodically (with an
exogenous probability).
The capital producers use the investment goods to invest in capital. They sell the
new capital to the entrepreneurs. To buy raw capital, entrepreneurs need to borrow a
fraction of the capital value as they are not able to completely self-finance their purchase.
They use their personal wealth as well as loans obtained from a financial intermediary.
Raw capital cannot be directly used in the production sector that uses effective capital.
Entrepreneurs extract production services from the purchased raw capital and transform
it into effective capital. They resell this effective capital to intermediate firms.
The monopolistic intermediate firms produce intermediate goods using the labor of
the households and the rented capital of the entrepreneurs. They sell their production to
a final good producer. This competitive final good producer aggregates the intermediate
goods and converts the output into consumption goods, investment goods, goods used up
in capital utilization and in bank monitoring.
The bank is a competitive bank that makes portfolio investment decisions. It allocates
the savings across loans to entrepreneurs and foreign bonds. The loan contract is char-
acterized by agency problems subject to financial shocks: the entrepreneurs can observe
their shock realization, but the bank needs to verify the state of the entrepreneur and pay
the implied state verification cost.
The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate of the European Monetary
Union (EMU hereon) given its past value, the deviations of inflation respect to their
steady-state values, and a stochastic disturbance, which is referred as the monetary policy
shock. Following Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2010), the deviation of Spanish inflation
from EMU’s inflation is described as a zero mean idiosyncratic shock. We can see the
representation of our economy in Figure 3.6.
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The final good producer aggregates the intermediate firms goods and produces the









, where1 ≤ λf,t <∞ (3.1)
where Yj,t are the intermediate goods and λf,t is the substitution rate between the inter-
mediate goods.
We assume that there is a unit of intermediate good producers, denoted by j where
j ∈ (0, 1), that produce with the following technology:
Yt =
εtKαj,t(ztlj,t)1−α − Φz∗t if εtKαj,t(ztlj,t)1−α > Φz∗t0 otherwise
where εt is a transitory productivity shock, Kj,t is the capital, zt is a persistent component
of technology, lj,t denotes the homogeneous labor, 0 < α < 1 denotes the capital income
share and Φ denotes the fixed cost of production. The persistent technology shock is
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where Υ has to be greater than one in order to capture the increasing growth rate of the
economy.
The homogeneous labor employed by the firms is an aggregate of the differentiated









where 1 < λw, where λw is the substitution rate between the differentiated labor.
























In equilibrium, the ratio of the marginal productivity of the producing factors has to
be equal to the ratio of the cost of renting the factors. Using this equilibrium condition

















The real marginal cost of renting one unit of capital divided by its marginal productivity










The ratio of marginal productivities has to be equal to the ratio of the cost of renting
in equilibrium. Therefore, using the ratio of the marginal productivity of capital and








The model uses a variant of Calvo sticky prices. We assume that (1−ξp) of intermediate
firms can reoptimize their price: Pi,t = P̃t. The other ξp will set their price according to
the following partial indexation rule:
Pi,t = π̃tPi,t−1,
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π̃t = (πtarget)ι(πt−1)1−ι,
where πt−1 = Pt−1Pt−2 is the inflation rate at time t− 1.
A firm able to change its price, will choose a price that maximizes the discounted

















From the first order condition of the above problem and using the assumption that
Kp,t and Fp,t have convenient recursive representations when λf,t is non-stochastic, we


















 = 0, (B5)











two optimality conditions characterize the stickiness of the prices in the model.




































Rewriting the intermediate firms’ production function using the new notation the
following expression obtains:

















There is a representative competitive bank that receives deposits from the households
and gives loans to entrepreneurs. It also can diversify its portfolio buying risk-free foreign
bonds.
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It is assumed that the entrepreneurs cannot completely self-finance the capital acquisi-
ton therefore they ask a loan to the bank. An entrepreneurs signs a contract with the
bank in which if the shock is less than the threshold value the entrepreneur bankrupts
and the bank needs to pay some monitoring costs in order to observe the default of the
entrepreneur (there is a costly verification state (CVS) of bankruptcy). The contract also
states that the entrepreneurs pay a gross interest Zt+1 on their bank loans.
The cutoff value that sets the default of the entrepreneur is defined by:
ω̄t+1(1 +Rkt+1)QK̄,tK̄t+1 = Zt+1Bt (3.9)
where the loans are equal to the price of purchasing capital that the entrepreneurs cannot
self-finance: Bt+1 = QK̄,tK̄t+1 −Nt+1.
The loans to the entrepreneurs, Bt, are set in a contract that maximize the en-
trepreneurs expected state. This condition establishes that the payback to entrepreneurs
can not be higher than what the banks receives from them:
[1− Ft(ω̄)]Zt+1Bt+1 + (1− µ)
∫ ω̄t+1
0
ωdFt(1 +Rkt+1)QK̄,tK̄t+1 = (1 +Ret+1)Bt+1, (3.10)
where the left hand side of the equation expresses the total payback from the entrepreneurs
as the the payback of the surviving entrepreneurs and assets of the bankrupt entrepreneurs
net of monitoring costs. The right hand side is the gross nominal payback of the loans.
We set this interest rate to Ret+1. This interest rate is set in the period in which the
contract is signed therefore it is not contemporaneous to the shock.














Γt(ω̄t+1) is the share of entrepreneurial earnings, (1+Rkt+1)QK̄tK̄t+1, received by the bank
subsidiary before monitoring costs. The object, Γt(ω̄t+1) − µGt(ω̄t+1) is the share net of
monitoring costs. Also, 1 − Γt(ω̄t+1) denotes the share of gross entrepreneurial earnings
obtained by entrepreneurs.
The entrepreneurial earnings are given by the entrepreneurs that do not bankrupt and
















The standard debt contract has two parameters, the loan amount Bt+1 and a non-
default interst rate Zt+1 (or equivalently ω̄). The two parameters are chosen to maximize
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the end-of-contract level of net worth for the entrepeneur, equation 3.13, subject to the






















where ηt+1 represents the Lagrange multiplier, which is a function of the period t+1 state
of nature.




















and their respective derivatives are:
Γ′t(ω̄t+1) = 1− Γt(ω̄t+1)− ω̄t+1Γ′t(ω̄t+1) +G′t(ω̄t+1) = 1− Γt(ω̄Nt+1)
G′t(ω̄t+1) = ω̄t+1Γ′t(ω̄t+1)
Rewriting the zero profit condition with the new terminology it gives:
(1 +Rkt+1) [Γ(ω̄t+1)− µG(ω̄t+1)] = (1 +Ret+1)Bt+1, (B8)
Funding
There is representative competitive bank. The bank’s net source of funds at the end
of period, Πbt , is:
Πbt = (1 +Re)Bt + (1 +Rb)BOt +Dt+1 − (1 +Rt)Dt −Bt+1 −BOt+1 (3.15)
The bank’s sources of fund at this point in time are: interest and principal on en-
trepreneurial loans extended in the previous period, the interest and the principal of the
bonds, and the deposits the banks has received at the start of this period. The bank uses
these funds to extend new loans, to buy news foreign bonds and to pay the interest and
the principal of the deposits. In solving this problem, the bank takes rates of return as
given. In addition, Bt+1 is determined by the bank’s lending channel of the sub-section
3.5.2, and so here Bt+1 is also taken as given. At date t, the banks chooses BOt+1.










where the left hand side of the equation shows the lost in the marginal utility of using
the extra units to buy foreign bonds, λzt. The right side shows the discounted utility of




units to diversify in its portfolio.
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3.5.3 Households
Households are composed by workers, capital producers and entrepreneurs. The work-
ing households consume, supply differentiated work in a monopolistic labour market, and
allocate savings as deposits on the bank. Capital producers combine undepreciated phys-
ical capital with new investment subject to a marginal efficiency of investment shock.
Entrepreneurial households have a special ability to operate capital. For simplicity pur-
poses we divide each kind of household decision-making process below.
Consumption and Deposits decision
There is a continuum of households, j ∈ (0, 1) that consume, save as deposits and













where b is the internal habit on consumption, σL is the disutility parameter of labor and
ad is the utility parameter of deposits.




wj,thj,tdj + (1−Θ)(1− γt)Vt +Lumpt + (1 +Ret )dt = dt+1 +we + (1 + τ c)ptct,
(3.16)
where, τ l, τ c are the taxes on labor earnings and consumption, respectively. On the left
side of the above equation there are the wages net of taxes, the net fraction of the bankrupt
net worth, the lump sum transfers and the gross nominal returns on deposits. On the
right hand side there are the new deposits, the fixed transfers to the new entrepreneurs
and the consumption expenses.
From the maximization of the households, we obtain the next two Euler equations:





] = 0 (B10)
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where the continue here
Wage process
A representative, competitive labor contractor aggregates differentiated labor services,
hi,t, i ∈ [0, 1] into homogeneous labor, lt, using the production function in equation 3.2.
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We assume that (1−ξw) fraction of households can re-optimize their wage, wj,t = w̃j,t.
The other fraction, ξw cannot reoptimize their wage and set their wage as:
wj,t = π̃w,t(µ∗z)1−ϑ(µ∗z,t)ϑwj,t−1,
π̃w,t = (πtarget)ιw(πt−1)1−ιw ,
where 0 < ιw < 1.









−ζc,t+iζt+iz(hj,t+i + λt+i(1− τ lt+i)Wj,t+ihj,t+i
}
(3.19)
where, z(h) = ΨL h
1+σL
1+σL .




The workers choose to optimize their wages, solve the maximization of equation 3.17
subjet to the demand of labor, equation 3.20. From the wage optimization of the firms
we obtain the next two relations:
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The capital producer takes the used capital from the entrepreneur (1−δ)k̄t and decides
how much to invest taking into account the technology to transform used capital and
investment into new capital. This technology function, F (It, It−1, ζi,t), is expressed as
(1 − S(It, It−1, ςi,t))It. The function S(It, It−1, ςi,t) measures the investment adjustment
costs. It is a strictly increasing function in deviations of the investment from the steady
state. This function S is chosen because in the steady state the function and the first
derivative are equal to zero. This function is:
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In order to obtain market equilibrium, we assume that the last period depreciated
capital is reacquired completely by the entrepreneurs. They also choose, taking this
quantity as given, the amount of investment they want to pursue. Therefore, the capital
evolves as:
k̄t+1 = (1− δ)k̄t + F (It, It−1, ςi,t) = (1− δ)k̄t + (1− S(It, It−1, ςi,t))It. (B15)



















Figure 3.7: One period in the life of an entrepreneur
Taken from Christiano et al. (2010)
There is a unity of entrepreneurs in each period that borrows, resell their acquired
capital and sells them to the intermediate good firms for production. Figure 3.7 states
clearly the timeline of the decisions taken by the entrepreneur. As stated above, the
entrepreneurs buy new capital from the capital producers and receive a random shock,
denoted by ω, in their capital acquisition. This shock follows a log normal distribution
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with mean 1 and σt stochastic variance. The variance captures the risk aversion of the
entrepreneurs. Figure 3.8 shows the effect of an increase in the variance of the idiosyncratic
shock process. When the variance increases the probability of entrepreneurs in the left
tail increases. This makes the investment riskier and as a consequence the interest rate
on loans increases. Therefore, the entrepreneur borrows less and the economy tanks due
to the decrease in investment.
Figure 3.8: Log Normal Distribution: 20 percent jump in standard deviation





where σa > 0, and rk is the steady-state rental rate of capital in the model. This function
is designed so that utilization is unity in steady-state, independent of the value of the
parameter σa. Due to the formulation of a(u), higher utilization rates have higher costs.
The user cost-function:
Pt+1Υ−(t+1)τ oilt+1a(ut+1)ωK̃t+1 (3.22)






t+1 − τ oilt+1a(ut+1)
]
ωK̃t+1Pt+1Υ−(t+1) (3.23)
After observing the shock at t + 1 they decide the level of capital utilization ut+1
and rent the capital services, ωkt+1 = ωut+1k̄t+1. The first order condition of the capital
utilization rate derives:
rkt+1 = τ oilt+1a′(ut+1) = τ oilt+1exp(σa(ut−1)) (B7)
where the function a is a(ut) = r
k
σa
{exp(σa(ut−1))− 1} and τ oilt+1 is meant to capture the
costs of production linked to the oil use in the production.





pt+1 + (1− δ)Qk̄t+1ωk̄t+1
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pt+1 + (1− δ)Qk̄t+1
Qk̄,t
+ τ kδ = 1 +Rkt+1 (B17)
where 1 + Rkt+1 is the average nominal interest rate across entrepreneurs, τ k is the tax
rate on capital income and δ is the depreciation rate on capital.
The entrepreneurs do not have enough net worth to buy the capital and therefore,
they finance a part of their capital acquisition by the loans of the bank. They sign a
contract in which there is set a threshold value, ω̄. If their shock is below this threshold,
they will go bankrupt and they will give their assets to the bank. If their shock realization
is above this threshold they will pay a interest Zt+1 on their loan. The threshold value is
defined as:
ω̄t+1(1 +Rkt+1)Qk̄,tk̄t+1 = Zt+1Bt+1
where the loans are expressed as the difference between the rental price of capital and the
net worth:
Bt+1 = Qk̄,tk̄t+1 − nt+1
As mentioned above, if ω < ω̄ they will go bankrupt and they will turn over their assets
to the bank. The entrepreneurs know the realization of their shock but the Bank can not
observe it. Due to this asymmetry of information the bank will need to pay a fraction of
the assets of the bankrupt entrepreneurs as a monitoring cost, µ(1+Rkt+1)ωQk̄,tk̄t+1. Upon
exiting the economy the net worth of the bankrupt entrepreneurs is divided. A fraction
of their net worth, (1 − γt)ΘVt, will be consumed upon the exit and the remaining,
(1 − γt)(1 − Θ)Vt, will be transferred as a lump-sum payment to the households. Each
period there is a unity of entrepreneurs and (1 − γt+1) of them will exist the economy.
Therefore, every period the same fraction of entrepreneurs will enter the economy in
order to keep the mass of entrepreneurs unchanged. The new entrepreneurs will receive
a transfer from the households, denoted by we, to have net wealth and be able to borrow
from the bank when they enter the economy. The law of motion of the net worth across
entrepreneurs is:
n̄t+1 = γt((1+Rkt+1)Qk̄t−1 k̄t−
[










where γt is the financial wealth shock capturing the part of value of the entrepreneurs





is the premium cost of external finance,
the left hand side of the square brackets are the paybacks of renting the capital, the next
terms between brackets are the average payments by entrepreneurs to banks per unit of
currently borrowed multiplied by the loans, the last term, we, is the transfer from the
households.






In our analysis we include a more complex risk shock process in order to include the
advance information that agents acquire about the future. In this way we have included
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the agents perceptions and forecasts about risk. As we have seen, the crisis in Spain was
forecasted by some agents. Therefore, our empirical exercises is based in well motivated
micro facts that are supported on the recent financial crisis.
The risk shock is different to the other shock due to its more complex structure. We
explicitly include advanced information in risk shocks before the innovation is realized.
The shock representation is:
σt = ρσσt − 1 + ξ0,t + ξ1,t−1 + ...+ ξp,t−p︸ ︷︷ ︸
=vt
(B*)
where ρ is an autoregressive parameters. σt is innovation to the risk shock process and vt
is the i.i.d. statistical innovation in σt. We expresss the variable vt as a sum of i.i.d., mean
zero random variables. We assume that in period t, agents observe ξj,t,, j = 0, 1, ..., 8. We
refer to ξ0,t as the unanticipated component of vt and to ξj,t as the anticipated, or news,
components of vt+j for j > 0.
For the sake of parameter parsimony, we place the following structure on the variances
of the shocks: (Eξ20,t) = σ2x, (Eξ21,1) = (Eξ22,1) = ..., (Eξ2p,1) = σ2x,η.
3.5.4 Closing the Model























where the left hand side is the total output of the economy. On the right hand side,
we have the monitoring cost of bankrupt entrepreneurs, the capital utilization cost, the
fraction consumed by the bankrupt entrepreneurs upon exiting the economy, the govern-
ment spending, the consumption, the investment with its adjustment costs, the return on
previous bonds and the bonds bought in this period.
Our model is a small open economy with incomplete asset markets. Therefore, the
steady state will depend on the equilibrium dynamics that posses a random walk com-
ponent. In order to close the model and assure convergence we apply the elastic interest
process proposed by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003):





where the German bond interest rate depends slightly on the bond holding by the Spanish
bank.
The nominal interest rate is set by the ECB which takes into account inflation in the
monetary union (EMU):









where εpt is a monetary policy shock, 0 < ρp < 1 is the smoothing parameter in the policy
rule and απ > 0. πEAt −πEA∗ is the deviation of quarterly inflation from the ECB inflation
target.
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As in Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2010), we assume that the deviations of inflation
with respect to its Euro Area counterpart is described by zero mean idiosyncratic shocks.
Formally,





where επt is an AR(1) idiosyncratic shock. Using this condition the policy rule can be
rewrriten as








t − (1− ρp)απεπt (B23)
3.6 Data and estimation results
We use data on thirteen variables covering the period 2000Q1-2017Q4. These include
ten time series that are standard in Bayesian estimation of DSGE models: GDP, con-
sumption, investment, inflation, EMU inflation, wage, price of investment, hours worked,
real interest rate and short-term risk-free interest rate. As Christiano et al. (2014), we
also use three financial variables: credit, entrepreneurial net worth and credit spread.3
All data are quarterly and, except for the short-term interest rate, inflation, hours worked
and the external finance premium, they are logged and first-differenced. Moreover, before
the estimation, data are demeaned by removing their sample mean, with the exception of
inflation, the short-term interest rate, which are demeaned in the model by subtracting
their estimated steady-state values.
Table 3.1: Calibrated Parameters (Time unit of model: quarterly)
β Discount rate 0.99
σL Curvature of disutility of labor 1
ψL Disutility weight on labor 0.7705
λw Steady-state markup, suppliers of labor 1.05
λf Steady-state markup, intermediate good firms 1.2
µz Growth rate of the economy 1.0041
Υ Trend rate of investment-specific technological change 1.0042
δ Depreciation rate on capital 0.025
α Power on capital in production function 0.4
1− γ Fraction of entrepreneurial net worth transferred to households 1-0.985
W e Transfer received by entrepreneurs 0.005
ηg Steady-state government spending-GDP ratio 0.22
τ c Tax rate on consumption 0.13
τ k Tax rate on capital income 0.32
τ l Tax rate on labor income 0.241
We partition the model parameters into two sets. The first set contains parameters
that are calibrated using data of Spain between the first quarter of 2000 and the fourth
quarter of 2017.4 Therefore, each period in the model represents one quarter. Some
3See Appendix B for details about the different time series used in the Bayesian estimation procedure.
4A detailed description of the data sources used in this analysis are available in Appendix B .
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parameters are borrowed from the literature. Table 3.1 shows the calibrated values of
all the fixed parameters of the model. The discount rate parameter, β, has a value of
0.99 that is standard in the literature. The Frisch elasticity of labor supply σL is set to
1. There are no natural units for the measurement of hours worked in the model, so we
arbitrarily set υL as in Christiano et al. (2014) so that hours worked is unity at the steady
state. Following Christiano et al. (2014), we fix the steady-state markups in the labor
market λw and in the product market λf at 1.05 and 1.2, respectively.
The depreciation rate that we use is slightly higher at δ = 0.025 than the one used
in Burriel et al. (2010) (δ = 0.0175). Also, the output-capital elasticity used in the
production function is 0.04 points higher. However, the tax rate on consumption and
labor, 0.13, 0.34 are borrowed from Burriel et al. (2010). We set the mean growth rate µz of
the unit root technology shock and the quarterly rate of investment-specific technological
change υ to 0.41 percent and 0.42 percent, respectively. These values are chosen to ensure
that the model steady state is consistent with the mean growth rate of per capita, real
GDP in our sample, as well as the average rate of decline in the price of investment goods.
The steady-state value of the parameter controlling the rate at which the household
tranfers equity from entrepreneurs to itself, 1 − γ, is set to 1-0.985. This is fairly close
to 1-0.973 value used by Christiano et al. (2014). The steady-state value of ηg is set to
ensure that the ratio of government consumption to GDP is 0.22 in steady state. Our
settings of the consumption, labor, and capital income tax rates, τc, τl, τk, respectively,
are taken from Burriel et al. (2010).
The remaining parameters are estimated through a Bayesian procedure. The priors
and posteriors of estimated structural parameters and shock processes, are detailed in
Table 3.2. Our estimated parameter values are reasonably close to the ones obtained in
the literature on the Spanish economy. For example, our estimated habit parameter value
is 0.712 close to the estimated value of 0.795 in Burriel et al. (2010). F (ω̄) and µp are
the parameters characterizing the entrepreneur bankruptcy. The estimated probability
of default and the monitoring cost estimated values are similar to the ones obtained in
Christiano et al. (2014) and seem to be well identified.
The Calvo price setting probability has an estimated value of 0.778 compared with
the higher value obtained in Burriel et al. (2010) (0.904). The wage setting probability
has an estimated value of 0.677, which is more standard than the low estimate of 0.235 in
Burriel et al. (2010). Apparently, the more complex representation of our economy, it is
able to capture the high stickiness of the economy and consequently, the wage and price
setting probabilities, ζw and ζp, take more reasonable values. The rest of the parameters
characterizing wage and price settings are the weights on steady state inflation in the
indexation rules of wages and prices, ιw and ιp, respectively. Their estimated values are
similar to the values estimated by Christiano et al. (2014). The parameters controlling
the investment process of the entrepreneur, σa, S ′ and ρτoil , are the capital utilization
rate, the investment adjustment cost and the oil price shock parameters, respectively. The
estimated capital utilization rate is higher, 1.864, than the 0.248 estimated in Burriel et al.
(2010). However, note that the 90% posterior probability interval is large. The investment
adjustment cost is estimated with a value of 15.893 in contrast with the 28.995 value
obtained by Burriel et al. (2010). The estimated oil price shock parameter is 0.859 and
significantly lower than the one estimated by Christiano et al. (2014). Our model includes
several sticky mechanisms necessary to assure the uniqueness of the rational expectation
equilibrium (i.e. the fulfillment of the Blanchard and Khan (1980) conditions). In regards
to the monetary policy rule, the estimated value of the parameter featuring the reaction
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of the nominal interest rate to inflation shows a sound value of 2.05. With a estimated
coefficient greater than one, the Taylor rule satisfies the Taylor principle
The estimated autoregressive parameters of the shocks show a high inertia and thus
a strong long-run response to shocks, with the exceptions of the estimated autoregressive
parameter of the persistent productivity shock, ρµ∗z,t , and the government consumption
shock, ρgt , that are close to zero in line with the findings of Christiano et al. (2014).
The posterior standard deviations of shocks, show that sample information helps identify
them, as can be seen in the narrow estimated 90% posterior probability intervals.
Table 3.2: Model priors and posteriors
Prior Posterior
Parameter Type Mean SD Mean 90% CI
ξw: Calvo wages Beta 0.75 0.1 0.677 0.651- 0.697
b: Habit parameter Beta 0.5 0.1 0.712 0.674- 0.753
F (ω̄): Steady-state prob. of default Beta 0.008 0.004 0.037 0.026- 0.047
µp: Monitoring cost Beta 0.275 0.15 0.114 0.088- 0.147
σa: Capacity utilization Normal 1 1 1.864 0.551- 2.72
S ′: Investment adjust. cost Normal 5 3 15.893 13.642-17.921
ξp: Calvo prices Beta 0.5 0.1 0.778 0.727- 0.821
απ: Weight on inflation in Taylor rule Normal 1.5 0.25 2.05 1.916- 2.198
ρτoil : Oil price shock Beta 0.75 0.1 0.859 0.833- 0.872
ιp: Weight on steady state inflation Beta 0.5 0.15 0.838 0.786- 0.894
ιw: Weight on steady state inflation Beta 0.5 0.15 0.5 0.353- 0.735
ιmu: Wage weight on persis. tech. growth Beta 0.5 0.15 0.907 0.856- 0.95
ρsignals: Correlation coefficient of signals Beta 0.5 0.2 0.929 0.883- 0.988
ρλf,t : Price mark-up shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.922 0.901- 0.951
ρµt : Equity shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.962 0.942- 0.987
ρgt : Government consumption shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.078 0.035- 0.134
ρµ∗z : Persistent. product. shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.883 0.832- 0.922
ρεt : Transitory product. shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.834 0.795- 0.862
ρπ: Idiosyn. inflat. innov. Beta 0.5 0.2 0.928 0.901- 0.952
ρζc : Demand shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.969 0.924- 0.989
ρζi : Margin. effic. of invest. shock invg2 0.001 0.001 0.134 0.121- 0.155
σσ,π: Std. dev., anticipated risk shock invg2 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002- 0.003
σσ,0: Std. dev., unanticipated risk shock invg2 0.002 0.003 0.022 0.019- 0.024
σλf,t : Price markup shock invg2 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.006- 0.009
σµt : Equity shock invg2 0.002 0.003 0.027 0.026- 0.029
σgt : Government consumption shock invg2 0.002 0.003 0.012 0.011- 0.013
σµ∗z : Persistent. product. shock invg2 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.005- 0.007
σγt : Financial wealth shock invg2 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.007- 0.008
σt : Transitory product. shock invg2 0.583 0.825 1.645 1.335- 1.891
σεt : Monetary policy shock invg2 0.583 0.825 0.032 0.032- 0.034
σπ: Std. dev. of idiosyn. inflat. innov. invg2 0.002 0.003 0.049 0.044- 0.055
σζc : Demand shock invg2 0.002 0.003 0.02 0.015- 0.027
σζi : Margin. effic. of invest. shock invg2 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.003- 0.008
Meas. error, Real Net Worth Growth Weibull 0.01 5 0.045 0.037- 0.053
The steady state properties of our model when parameters are set to their mean for
Spain are provided in Table 3.3 as well as the corresponding historical values. As shown
in this table, the model characterizes the long-run features in the data to same extent,
but there are quantitative differences. We think that these differences are due to the
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extreme simple specification of the external finance and the banking sector. Our strategy
for computing the posterior distribution of the model parameters does not make use of
information in the data about the sort of ratios displayed in Table 3.3. Therefore, it is
not surprising that when the model parameters are assigned their values at the posterior
mode, the model’s performance relative to these ratios in Table 3.3 deteriorates somewhat.
Table 3.3: Steady-state properties, Model at priors versus data












Transfer received by new entrepreneurs as percent of GDP 0.002
Credit velocity 0.245
Short-term risk free rate (APR) 4.668
3.6.1 Estimation results
Figure 3.9 displays the year-over-year growth rate of GDP, the log-level of equity, the
year-over-year growth rate of credit and the and credit spread. The solid lines are the
observed data and the dotted lines are the results of our estimated model simulations. We
can see that in Panel A and D the two lines are close to each other. This implies that the
decline in GDP after the 2007 recession is well captured by our model. The off-diagonal
panels (B and C) show that our model results in larger fluctuations of both the equity
level and the growth rate of credit.
Figure 3.9: The role of risk shock in the observed variables
Table 3.4 displays the forecast error variance decomposition of observable variables at
business cycle frequencies considering periodic components with cycles of 8-to-32 quarters,
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obtained using the model spectrum. Table 3.5 reports the variance decomposition for
long-term periodic components defined by cycles lasting 9-to-15 years. The statistics are
derived using the mode of the posterior distributions of the shocks reported in Table 3.4.
We find three important results related to the explanatory power of the shocks over the
business cycle. First, the anticipated risk shock dominates all other shocks. It explains
89% of the variation in GDP and more than three quarters of the variation in investment
and credit at the business cycle frequencies. These proportions increase when we analyze
its contribution at low frequency cycles, when the cointegration of financial variables and
the real economy is stronger. Second, the anticipated risk shock affects the economy
through the financial variables. This shock is able to explain 89% of the variations in
GDP, 88% in investment, 83% in the net worth and 100% in the premium. However,
it falls short to explain fluctuations in consumption and inflation. Third, these results
suggest that the unanticipated risk shock has no explanatory power in our model. This
result further highlights the importance of anticipated risk shocks during the financial
crisis. Before the crisis began, Spain was immersed in a credit bubble created in the
housing market. A few economic pundits started pointing out that the possibility of a
housing bubble. Therefore, the crisis was somewhat anticipated due to deep imbalances
in the real estate sector as well as the fears on a global financial recession hitting hardly
the local banking sector.
The consumption demand shock, ζc, is able to explain half of the variations in con-
sumption and it explains 9% of the changes in GDP. The markup shock, λf,t, helps
explaining 14% of the variations in GDP and 21% in consumption. The monetary policy
shock loses its standard explanatory power on the variations of macroeconomics variables.
The inflation differential innovation seems to capture the changes on the interest rates
and inflation. The inflation differential innovation is able to explain more than half of the
variations of the EMU inflation and the real and nominal interest rates. The rest of the
shocks do not show a high explanatory power. In particular, the efficiency of the invest-
ment shock, ζI,t, has not explanatory power when compared with the results reported in
Christiano et al. (2010) for the US.
In sum, our estimation results suggest that the anticipated risk shocks, σ1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,
play a crucial role in explaining the fluctuations of the Spanish economy in both the short
and the long run. In order to clarify these conclusions, we provide additional intuition





















Table 3.4: Variance decomposition at business cycle frequencies (Percent)
Variables/Shock Trans. Tech. Exog.Spend. Finan. Wealth Markup Persist. Tech. MP Demand M.E.I Idiosyn. inflat. innov. Unanticipated Risk Anticipated Risk
εt, µz,t gt γt λf,t µz,∗ εt ζc ζI,t πEA σt σ1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8
Consumption 8 0 0 21 6 0 51 0 11 0 1
Credit 2 0 2 4 0 0 1 0 1 0 89
GDP 4 3 0 14 7 0 9 0 11 0 52
Working hours 24 2 0 14 3 0 7 0 9 0 42
Inflation 18 0 0 42 0 1 12 0 21 0 8
EU Inflation 8 0 0 19 0 0 5 0 65 0 3
Investment 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 5 0 88
Net Worth 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 13 0 83
Price Invest. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Premium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
Interest Rate 8 0 0 17 0 2 6 0 63 0 5
Real Interest 6 0 0 13 0 2 5 0 71 0 4
Wages 7 0 0 52 33 0 2 0 4 0 1
Table 3.5: Variance decomposition at low frequencies (Percent)
Variables/Shock Trans. Tech. Exog.Spend. Finan. Wealth Markup Persist. Tech. MP Demand M.E.I Idiosyn. inflat. innov. Unanticipated Risk Anticipated Risk
εt, µz,t gt γt λf,t µz,∗ εt ζc ζI,t πEA σt σ1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8
Consumption 10 0 0 25 7 0 46 0 9 0 2
Credit 1 0 1 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 94
GDP 4 1 0 15 6 0 7 0 8 0 57
Working hours 14 1 0 20 2 0 7 0 9 0 45
Inflation 15 0 0 34 0 1 14 0 26 0 11
EU Inflation 10 0 0 23 0 1 10 0 49 0 8
Investment 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 90
Net Worth 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 10 0 87
Price Invest. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Premium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
Interest Rate 10 0 0 21 0 2 11 0 48 0 9
Real Interest 5 0 0 11 0 2 6 0 72 0 5
Wages 8 0 0 62 23 0 2 0 3 0 1
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3.6.2 The key role of risk signals
Figures 3.10 and 3.11 display the responses of macroeconomic variables to the unantici-
pated risk shock and anticipated risk signals to different horizons (σ where i=1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8),
respectively. These two graphs allow us to assess the relative importance of anticipated
versus unanticipated risk shocks.
Figure 3.10: Impulse Response Functions to an unanticipated risk shock, σ0,t
Figure 3.11: Impulse Response Functions to anticipated shocks, σ1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,t
Figures 3.10 and 3.11 allow us to assess the relative importance of anticipated versus
unanticipated risk shocks. Clearly, the responses to an unanticipated risk shock are much
smaller than those to the anticipated shocks. Moreover, we see that all the responses
across anticipated signals share the same sign. However, the longer horizon signals, seem
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to have a higher impact on macroeconomic variables than the short-term signals but the
size of the responses varies across variables. This finding is in line with Fujiwara et al.
(2011), where they conclude that news shocks with longer signal horizons have larger
effects on nominal variables.
The unanticipated and anticipated risk shock responses are consistent with economic
intuition. Thus, when the risk increases, the probability of a poor performance of en-
trepreneurs increases and the interest rate on loans increases. The increase in interest
rates has two effects on entrepreneurs. First, it makes borrowing more expensive. Second,
the “Fisher deflation” effect that refers to the decrease in the net worth that occur when
an unexpected decrease in the price level increases the real value of their debt decreasing
their net worth. As a consequence of these two effects, the entrepreneurs borrow less and
purchase less capital. Therefore, the investment drops leading to a fall in output and
consumption. The fall in investment decreases the price of capital, which magnifies the
effect of the “Fisher deflation effect”, and further reduces the net worth of entrepreneurs.
The economy enters in a recession phase. However, we have included German foreign
bonds in our model. Thus, the economy recover from the national slow-down relaying on
the purchase of risk-free foreign bonds. Therefore, holding risk-free bonds helps off-set
the effects of the propagation of systemic risk in the national economy (i.e. Spain).
Figure F.1 displays the period-to-period contribution of each shock to the GDP growth.
Clearly the anticipated risk shocks, displayed as blue, dominate all other shocks in ex-
plaining the fluctuations of GDP. Moreover, the anticipated risk signals are able to explain
almost all the variations in the premium as shown in Figure F.2.
Figure 3.12: Impulse Response Functions to an idiosyncratic inflation innovation, πSP
Figure 3.12 shows the impulse-response functions to an idiosyncratic inflation inno-
vation. As we have seen before, the inflation differential is able to explain 11% of the
variations in GDP and more than 60% of the variation on interest rates. An increase
in the inflation differential means that inflation in Spain increases relative to EMU’s in-
flation. As a consequence, the real value of the entrepreneurial net worth increases and
the interest rate decreases which allows the entrepreneurs to borrow more. Thus, credit
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and investment increase. However, the increase in the investment sector is not able to
offset the increase of the level of prices in the Spanish economy. As a consequence of the
decrease in the interest rates on credits to entrepreneurs, banks start buying more foreign
bonds. Thus, the national output decreases creating a slow-down of the small economy
(i.e. Spain).
We have used the impulse response to support our claim that the anticipated risk shock
and the idiosyncratic inflation innovation in our empirical analysis are key in explaining
the Spanish business cycle. We have seen that the anticipated risk shocks result in larger
responses on the macroeconomic variables than those associated with an unanticipated
risk shock. Next, we will analyze the transmission mechanism behind more standard
shocks, such as the monetary policy shock, the transitory technology shock, and others.
Figure 3.13: Impulse Response Functions to a three shock: ξ0, ζi, σ
Figure 3.13 displays the responses to three shocks: the unanticipated risk shock, the
innovation in the marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) and a negative innovation in
equity shock. Our computed impulse response functions resemble those obtained by Chris-
tiano et al. (2014) for the US. The explanatory power of the unanticipated risk shock,
the MEI shock and the negative equity shock is in all cases small. Even if the unan-
ticipated risk shock does not have any explanatory power in our model the signs of the
impulse responses are intuitively correct as we have seen for the anticipated risk shocks.
Counterintuitively, and in line with the results obtained by Christiano et al. (2010), an
innovation in the marginal efficiency of investment decreases investment leading to a fall
in output.The responses to a negative innovation in the equity shock resemble the simu-
lated responses to a risk shock. A negative equity shock decreases the net worth of the
entrepreneurs, making their debt burden higher and decreasing the value of their assets.
As a result, the economy enters into a recession. However, due to the propagation of risk
into the economy, the households decide to increase their consumption. This generates,
an increase in the value of capital and a higher need of entrepreneurs to finance their
capital purchases. The increase in foreign bond purchases creates a higher decrease in
investment and output.
The impulse response functions to a standard monetary shock are shown in Figure 3.14.
The propagation mechanism behind this shock is similar to the one exhibited by the risk
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shocks. The monetary policy shock increases the interest rate. Thus, borrowing becomes
more expensive for entrepreneurs. At the same time, the real value of the entrepreneurial
net worth decreases. As a consequence, investment and consumption fall. This economic
decline induces a general loss in the small economy’s confidence, which leads to an increase
of the purchase of foreign-bonds. However, notice that the responses of the aggregate
macroeconomic variables are much smaller when a monetary policy shock takes place
than when the economy receives risk signals in advance.
Figure 3.14: Impulse Response Functions to a monetary policy shock, ε
3.7 Conclusion
This paper studies the role of the risk signals as a trigger and propagator of the
financial crisis of the recession starting around 2008 in Spain. We use Bayesian techniques
to estimate a variant of Christiano et al. (2010, 2014) model that allows banks from the
small economy (e.g. Spain) to buy foreign bonds. Our model variant also includes the
inflation differential between Spain and the EMU in order to assess the efficiency of the
single monetary policy in the Spanish business cycle.
We estimate the model for Spain over the period 2000Q1-2017Q4. We use quarterly
observations of ten macroeconomic series that are standardly used in the estimation of
DSGE models and three additional financial time series: credit to non financial corpora-
tions, the risk premium of sovereign bonds and entrepreneurial net worth considered in
Christiano et al. (2010, 2014).
Our empirical results show that anticipated risk shocks account for a sizeable 52% of
fluctuations in the GDP, 89% in credit and 100% in the risk premium. The idiosyncratic
innovation of inflation also appears to be an important driving force of the business cycle
fluctuations in Spain. This innovation accounts for a 11% of the variations in GDP and
13% in the net worth of entrepreneurs. Moreover, these shocks largely explain the episode
of credit crunch and the contraction of investment and output. Such a sequence has been
observed during the recent recession (2009-2013) in Spain which was likely anticipated
by economic pundits. Our results show that anticipated risk shocks dominate all other
shocks. Further research on the identification of news or “risk signals” is warranted in
order to understand better the causes and consequences of the last recession in Spain.
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Data appendix
We provide the sources for the twelve observed variables used in the estimation.
Population series are used to normalize quantity variables.
• GDP: Gross domestic product at market price, Chain linked volumes, reference
year 2010, Quarterly, Working day and seasonally adjusted, (ECB series).
• Consumption: Final consumption of households and NPISH’s, Chain linked vol-
umes, reference year 2010, Quarterly, Working day and seasonally adjusted, (OECD
database).
• Investment: Gross fixed capital formation, Chain linked volumes, reference year
2010, Quarterly, Working day and seasonally adjusted, EA 17 fixed composition,
(ECB series).
• Inflation: Deflator of Gross domestic product at market price, Quarterly, Working
day and seasonally adjusted, (FRED series), logarithmic first difference.
• EU Inflation: Deflator of Gross domestic product at market price, Quarterly,
Working day and seasonally adjusted, EA 17 fixed composition (database), loga-
rithmic first difference.
• Price of investment: Deflator of Gross fixed capital formation, Quarterly, Work-
ing day and seasonally adjusted, (OECD database).
• Hours worked: Hours of All Employees, Quarterly, Working day and seasonally
adjusted, (ECB series).
• Wage: Compensation of Employees, received by Households and NPISH’s, Quar-
terly, Seasonally adjusted, (OECD database).
• Short-term risk-free rates: Nominal Short-Term Interest Rate (AWM: STN) and
Euribor 3-month, Historical close, Quarterly, average observation through period,
(ECB series).
• Credit: Loans to Non-financial corporations, Closing balance sheet, Quarterly,
Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted, (ECB series).
• Entrepreneurial net worth: IBEX35 Index, Historical close, Quarterly, average
observation through period, (BOLSA DE MADRID database).
• Population: Working Age Population: Aged 15-64: All Persons for the Euro Area,
Persons, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted , (FRED series).
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66 APPENDIX C. LIST OF EQUATIONS OF THE MODEL
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+ τ kδ = 1 +Rkt+1 (B17)
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Table D.1: Variables in the model
c∗t Scaled aggregate consumption
εt Transitory technology shock




k̄t+1 Scaled entrepreneurial capital
λf,t Intermediate goods stock
λz,t Marginal utility of consumption
µΥ,t Investment good technology shock
µz∗,t Growth rate of zstar
nt+1 Entrepreneurial net worth
ω̄t The omega separating bankrupt and non-bankrupt entrepreneurs
πt Inflation
p∗t Useful variable in pricing equation
qt Scaled market price of capital
Ret Nominal risk-free rate
rkt Rental rate of capital




ut Utilization rate of capital
w̃t Scaled real wage
w∗t Useful variable in wage equation
ζc,t Preference shock on consumption
ζI,t Marginal efficiency of investment




Fp,t Convenience variable for price evolution
Fw,t Convenience variable for wage evolution
φ Fixed cost that ensures zero profits
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Variables used to match the data
cobst Observed aggregate consumption
creditobs Observed credit
GDP obs Observed GDP




obs Observed nominal risk-free rate
Rre
obs Observed real risk-free rate
πt Observed inflation of Spain
πEUt Observed inflation of the EMU
iobs Observed investment
hobs Observed working hours
nobs Observed net worth
Exogenous variables
Table E.1: Shocks in the model
σ0,t: Unanticipated risk shock
σ1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,t: Anticipated risk shock
λf,t: Price markup shock
µt: Equity shock
gt: Government consumption shock
µ∗z: Persistent. product. shock
γt: Financial wealth shock
εt: Transitory product. shock
εt: Monetary policy shock
πSP : Idiosyncratic inflation innovation
ζc: Consumption preference shock























Figure F.1: Contribution to GDP growth
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Figure F.3: Contribution to consumption growth
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Figure F.5: Contribution to Net Worth growth
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Figure F.7: Contribution to working hours growth
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Figure F.8: Contribution to inflation

Learning, Parameter Variability, and
Swings in the US Macroeconomic Dy-
namics
- Has the Lucas Critique become less relevant?
“My paper, “Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique” was written in the
early 70s. Its main content was a criticism of specific econometric models—models
that I had grown up with and had used in my own work. These models implied
an operational way of extrapolating into the future to see what the “long run”
would look like. (...)
Of course every economist, then as now, knows that expectations matter but in
those days it wasn’t clear how to embody this knowledge in operational models.”
– R.E. Lucas Jr. Economic dynamics interviews Robert Lucas on modern
macroeconomics, Econ. Dyn. Newsl. (2012)
4.1 Abstract
Recent studies show that the estimated parameters of models (obtained under the ra-
tional expectations hypothesis) are largely time varying. This paper shows that assuming
adaptive learning (rather than rational expectations) reduces the estimated parameter
variability of standard models strongly (by around 68%). Moreover, the reduction in
parameter variability induced by adaptive learning is much stronger for the subsets of
parameters that control nominal price and wage rigidity and the subset of policy rule
parameters (at 91% and 100%, respectively). Furthermore, our estimation results suggest
that adaptive learning helps to explain the recent swings in the comovements between
real and nominal US macroeconomic variables, but the swing in the relative weight of
supply and demand shocks seems to be the most important driving force.
4.2 Introduction
Recent literature shows evidence that the parameters in the DSGE models used to study
aggregate fluctuations are in general time-varying (see, among others, Inoue and Rossi
(2011), Canova and Ferroni (2012), Castelnuovo (2012a,b), Hurtado (2014), Casares and
Vázquez (2018), Castelnuovo and Pellegrino (2018), Canova (2019)). These findings have
important implications. On the one hand, the instability of structural parameters some-
what weakens the ability of DSGE models to assess policies reliably (Fernández-Villaverde
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et al. (2007)). On the other hand, parameter variability may be an important source for
explaining the macroeconomic dynamic swings observed during the post-WWII era in the
US.
This paper analyzes parameter variability by estimating the canonical medium-scale
DSGE model suggested by Smets and Wouters (2007) under both RE and AL following
Slobodyan and Wouters (2012a,b) approach to AL. Both versions of the model are es-
timated for the whole sample and then using a 20-year rolling-window approach. Our
estimation results show that learning dynamics help to explain a large proportion of the
parameter variability observed under the standard RE hypothesis typically assumed in
macroeconomic modelling. The intuition is simple: Under RE, a time-invariant relation-
ship links the endogenous variables to the (predetermined and exogenous) state variables
of the economy whenever the structural parameters of the model are constant. Therefore,
parameter variability becomes the only source of macroeconomic dynamic swings under
RE other than that generated from the exogenous shocks of the model. By contrast, the
relationship linking endogenous variables with state variables becomes time varying under
AL even when the structural parameters are time invariant, which might result in much
richer macroeconomic dynamics.
• A time-invariant parameter scenario characterized by the RE estimated model using
the whole sample (1961:3-2016:2) where the dynamic swings are driven only by
specific shock realizations.
• A time-invariant model-parameter scenario described by the model estimated under
AL for the whole sample where the dynamic swings are the combined outcome of
specific shock realizations and the resulting changes in learning dynamics.
• A time-varying parameter scenario characterized by the model estimated under RE
using a rolling-window approach, where the dynamic swings are the result of both
specific shock realizations and shifts in model parameters.
• Finally, a time-varying parameter scenario characterized by the model estimated
under AL using a rolling-window approach, where the dynamic swings may be due to
all three sources, i.e. specific shock realizations, parameter variability, and learning.
Our estimation results show that assuming AL reduces parameter variability by roughly
68%. The reduction in parameter variability induced by AL is much stronger for the sub-
sets of parameters that control nominal price and wage rigidities and the policy rule
parameters (at 91% and 100%, respectively). Moreover, the AL version provides a better
model fit than the RE version. These findings certainly strengthen the potential of DSGE
models under AL for implementing policy assessment, showing that AL helps to resolve
the issue raised by Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2007). Moreover, our estimation results
also show that the AL model estimated does a better job in reproducing the dramatic
swings in the correlations between real and nominal variables observed in US data than
the RE version. Those correlations are found to be moderately negative in the 1960’s
and 1970’s but they become strongly positive more recently. Nonetheless, the fall in the
importance of supply shocks relative to demand shocks (due to the fall in both persistence
and the size of innovations of price- and wage-markup shocks as shown below) seems to be
the most important driving force in explaining these dramatic swings in the comovement
between real and nominal variables. In spite of the relative success of AL in explaining
these comovements, AL still falls short in explaining the recent fall in inflation persistence.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.3 discusses the related litera-
ture. Section 4.4 briefly describes the main features of the model. Section 4.5 discussed
the empirical results from both the whole sample and the rolling-window estimation ap-
proaches under RE and AL. The same section also quantifies the variability of the model
parameters under the two expectations hypotheses. Section 4.6 analyzes the ability of
the alternative model specifications to account for the recent US macroeconomic swings.
Section 4.7 concludes.
4.3 Related literature
US macroeconomic dynamics feature large swings during the post-World War II period:
From the stagnation of the 1970’s and early 1980’s (characterized by high macroeconomic
volatility, accelerating inflation, and low output growth) to the Great Moderation period
(featuring low volatility, decreasing inflation, and rather stable output growth) followed
by the Great Recession (featuring a few sudden drops in output and near zero inflation
levels).
Our paper relates to some strands of the literature that investigates these macroe-
conomic dynamic swings. In particular, there are two prominent hypotheses based on
parameter variability explaining the large swings in US macroeconomic dynamics from
the high-inflationary period of the 1970’s and early 1980’s to the Great Moderation period
(1984-2007). The first states that parameter variability is mostly associated with changes
in shock process parameters. Thus, the good-luck hypothesis put forward by Sims and
Zha (2006), among others, explains the Great Moderation period as the result of favor-
able outcomes of shock processes.1 Alternatively, the good-policy hypothesis suggested
by Clarida et al. (2000) explains the Great Moderation as the result of a sound monetary
policy featuring stable parameters that describe the reaction of the short-term nominal
interest rate to deviations of inflation and economic activity from their respective targets,
with a more agressive response of the policy rate to deviations of inflation from its target
since the early 1980’s (i.e. a Taylor (1993) rule).2
In recent empirical macroeconomics literature there are various approaches for analyz-
ing parameter variability in DSGE models. Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2007) estimate
a model assuming time-varying coefficients and stochastic volatilities. Another approach
considers a Markov regime-switching process (Bianchi (2012), and Liu et al. (2011)). As
pointed out by Castelnuovo (2012b), these approaches are admittedly extremely com-
pelling, but they also constrain the researcher to focus on a rather small number of
time-varying parameters due to their high computational costs. Cogley (2007) and In-
oue and Rossi (2011) argue that these "one-at-the-time" approaches are problematic on
econometric grounds because if the parameters considered as constant are actually time
varying, the estimation results may attribute the time variation to the wrong source.
As an alternative with more affordable computational costs, we follow the rolling-
window approach suggested by Canova and Ferroni (2012) to assess parameter variability
in estimated models. More precisely, they analyze the relationship between monetary
policy and inflation dynamics in the US by estimating a medium-scale DSGE model with
money using Bayesian techniques. They show that policy shocks account for part of the
1Many papers (among others, Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Cogley and Sargent (2005), and Primiceri
(2005)) find little evidence of a drastic change in the US monetary policy rule in the early 1980’s.
2Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006) provide further evidence supporting
this hypothesis.
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decline in inflation volatility. They also show that the variability of a few structural pa-
rameters contributes to this finding. Similarly, Castelnuovo (2012a) uses a rolling-window
Bayesian estimation of a DSGE model with money. He finds that a specification with
drifting parameters for money, consumption nonseparability and the Federal Reserve’s
reaction to nominal money growth fits the data better. In a similar vein, Hurtado (2014)
estimates Smets and Wouters (2007) model using a rolling-window approach. He shows
that most parameters, including those that were meant to be structural, exhibit major
shifts. This applies specifically to those related to Calvo price stickiness and the elasticity
of labor supply.
More recently, using a rolling-window approach as in Canova and Ferroni (2012) and
Castelnuovo (2012a,b), Casares and Vázquez (2018) analyze the weakening in the correla-
tion of inflation and the short-term nominal interest rate, known as the Gibson paradox.
They show that a flatter New Keynesian Phillips Curve (higher price stickiness) and a
lower persistence of markup shocks explain most of the Gibson paradox. In addition, a
higher interest-rate elasticity of money demand, an increasing role played by demand side
shocks, and less systematic behavior by the Fed’s monetary policy also account for the
recent patterns of US inflation dynamics.
The rolling-window approach also taken in this paper might have limitations because
it may miss out the role that time-varying parameters play in shaping expectations. Put
differently, it assumes that agents are unaware of parameter instability due to their neither
having memory of the past windows nor using past evidence on expectation updates
(Castelnuovo (2012b)). This caveat is overcome to some degree under AL because agents
learn from actual data in each window.3
3Moreover, notice that from the second and subsequent windows we consider the estimated parameters
from the previous window as initial values of the estimated parameters (including those characterizing
agents’ beliefs).
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Figure 4.1: Comovements of real and nominal variables




















Correlation of inflation and interest rate
Correlation of working hours and interest rate
Correlation of inflation and working hours
Correlation of inflation and output growth
Correlation of output growth and interest rate
Correlation of inflation with lagged inflation
Note: In all figures in this paper the year shown in the x-axis is the initial year of the
corresponding 20-year window.
At a deeper level, large macroeconomic dynamic swings involve (dramatic) changes in
the dynamic comovement between real and nominal variables, as illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1 uses a 20-year rolling-window approach to show the time-varying evolution
of the first-order autocorrelation of inflation and the contemporaneous correlation coef-
ficients between the following pairs of variables: Inflation and the nominal interest rate,
the nominal interest rate and hours worked, the nominal interest rate and output growth,
inflation and hours worked, and inflation and output growth. The fall in both inflation
persistence and the correlation between inflation and the nominal interest rate (i.e. the
Gibson paradox) has received some attention in the literature (Cogley et al. (2012); and
Casares and Vázquez (2018)), but the swings in the correlation between real and nominal
variables have so far not been acknowledged. For instance, the contemporaneous correla-
tion between the nominal interest rate and hours worked is moderately negative at around
-0.4 until the early 1980’s, but becomes strongly positive after the mid-1980’s, reaching
a peak of 0.9 in the last two decades.4 An exception is the correlation between (the
cyclical component of) real output and inflation, which has been widely studied (Fuhrer
and Moore (1995); Den Haan (2000)). Recently, Cassou and Vázquez (2014) extend the
methodology of Den Haan (2000) to compute correlations between output and inflation
at different forecast horizons, and propose a small-scale New-Keynesian monetary model
4The swings in the other correlations between real and nominal variables are more modest, but they
still imply switches from negative to positive correlations.
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to explain the patterns observed.5
This paper also relates to a recent paper by Milani (2019) by considering AL à la
Slobodyan and Wouters (2012a,b). He studies a small-scale New-Keynesian model to
examine how the estimated variability of the Fed’s inflation target can be determined
by the expectation hypothesis assumed. Milani (2019) finds that the estimated inflation
target exhibits large shifts over time (it is estimated at 2% in the early 1960’s, increases
to 8% in the 70’s, and goes down to 4% in the 1980’s and 2% in the 1990’s) when RE
is assumed. However, the estimated inflation target values are between 2% and 3% over
the whole postwar sample when AL is assumed. By assuming a medium-scale DSGE
model, we confirm Milani’s (2019) finding; however we also extend his analysis on the
implications of AL on the estimated variability of the Fed’s inflation target to a much
larger set of model parameters. Finally, regarding the potential of AL for explaining
macroeconomic swings, our paper also relates to Bullard and Singh (2012). They study
the reduction in volatility in the US during the Great Moderation period.6 They show
that including a learning mechanism accounts for about 30% of the volatility reduction
observed in postwar US data.
4.4 The DSGE model
We consider the workhorse model estimated in Smets and Wouters (2007) (henceforth,
SW) for the US economy, updated here with recent data covering the sample period
1961:3-2016:2.
The SW model contains both real and nominal frictions that affect decisions by house-
holds and firms. Thus, households maximize expected utility over an infinite horizon. Cur-
rent consumption utility includes an external habit component characterized by lagged
aggregate consumption. Households supply differentiated labor services and set nominal
wages subject to a Calvo (1983) lottery mechanism. Moreover, households decide on how
much capital to accumulate, given the investment adjustment cost function, and rent their
capital to monopolistic firms. Depending on the rental rate, the capital stock is used more
or less intensively.
Firms produce differentiated goods, decide on labor and capital inputs, and set the
prices of the goods that they produce, again according to the Calvo-lottery model. Marginal
costs of firms depend on wages, the rental rate of capital, and an exogenous productivity
shock. The Calvo models considered for price- and wage-setting assume partial indexation
to lagged inflation. Hence, inflation dynamics have both forward- and backward-looking
components. Moreover, a more general aggregator, which allows for a time-varying de-
5Their model features a very high degree of internal habit persistence, which generates a rich structure
on the demand side by introducing additional forward-looking terms into the dynamic IS curve that shows
up in the 3-equation New-Keynesian model. Their model does a good job in replicating the dynamic
correlation patterns at different horizons as long as the right balance between the effects of supply and
demand shocks obtains through a calibration method that resembles the simulated method of moments
(Lee and Ingram (1991), and Christiano et al. (2005)). However, they do not analyze the dynamic
correlations between other nominal and real variables analyzed in this paper.
6After 1984, variance in US macroeconomic aggregates declined because boom and recession regimes
moved closer together, keeping conditional variance unchanged. In their model, Bayesian households
attempt to learn the latent state of the economy by including an unobserved regime-switching process.
This process makes the signal extraction problem more difficult for Bayesian households, and they respond
by moderating their behavior, which reinforces the effect of a less volatile stochastic technology during
this period.
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mand elasticity, replaces the standard Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of both goods and labor
markets used in small-scale versions of the New-Keynesian model.
Finally, a Taylor-type rule describes monetary policy. This policy rule includes an
inertial component in addition to the policy reaction components associated with inflation,
the output gap, and the growth rate of output gap. We follow Slobodyan and Wouters
(2012a,b) by defining the output gap simply as the deviation of output from its underlying
neutral productivity process and not as the natural output gap considered in the SW
model. By doing this, we avoid the modeling of the flexible economy, which considerably
reduces the number of forward-looking variables that need to be characterized under AL.
The Appendix describes the complete log-linearized version of the SW model and
provides a brief explanation of how AL expectation formation works.
4.5 Data, estimation strategy, and empirical results
The data set used in the estimation exercises includes all the observable time series used
in Smets and Wouters (2007). Thus, we consider the growth rates (i.e. the first-differences
of the logarithms) of real GDP, real consumption, real investment, and real wage; and the
time series of the inflation rate (obtained as the first-differences of the log of the GDP
deflator), the federal funds rate, and the log of total hours worked. Moreover, per-capita
variables are computed using the civilian non-institutional population (16 years and over).
The sample period is 1961:3-2016:2.
In order to investigate potential parameter instability, the model was estimated un-
der both RE and AL, for a rolling-window sequence for eight consecutive periods sepa-
rated by a span of 5 years. This rolling-window estimation strategy results in the follow-
ing eight overlapping 20-year quarterly subsamples: (i) 1961:3-1981:2; (ii) 1966:3-1986:2;
(iii) 1971:3-1991:2; (iv) 1976:3-1996:2; (v) 1981:3-2001:2; (vi) 1986:3-2006:2; (vii) 1991:3-
2011:2; and (viii) 1996:3-2016:2.
The estimation follows a two-step Bayesian procedure for each version of the model
(i.e. the RE and AL versions) and each of the (sub-) samples defined above. In terms
of priors, we select the same set of distributions as in Smets and Wouters (2007), which
are shown in Table 4.1. The priors are identical across all (sub-) samples studied. This
is a rather conservative strategy in the present context because we do not want different
estimation results across our subsamples be an outcome of the use of different priors.
Table 4.1 further shows the posterior mean, and the 5%−95% confidence intervals for
the RE and AL versions of the model using the whole sample period. The log-likelihood
indicates that the AL version provides a better model fit than the RE version. Thus,
the marginal likelihood of the AL model is larger (−1248.71) than that associated with
the RE model (−1262.81). The estimated parameter coefficients show different estimated
values as already shown in Slobodyan and Wouters (2012a) for a slightly shorter sample
that does not include the Great Recession period. There are a few striking differences:
The estimate of the investment adjustment cost parameter is 5.50 under RE but is much
lower at 3.55 under AL. Similarly, the estimates of the wage indexation and steady-state
inflation (i.e. the Fed’s inflation target) parameters are much lower under AL (0.29 versus
0.65 and 0.58 versus 0.90, respectively). The lower estimate of the annual inflation target
under AL (2.32% = (0.58× 4)× 100) is in line with the estimate found by Milani (2019).
By contrast, the estimates of the risk aversion parameter and the inertial coefficient of the
policy rule are higher under AL than under RE. Regarding price and wage markup shock
persistence, AL implies almost i.i.d. shocks (the autoregressive and the moving-average
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Table 4.1: Estimated Posteriors of the Structural Parameters
RE AL
Log-likelihood -1262.81 -1248.71
Mean 5%-95% Mean 5%-95%
ϕ: cost of adjusting capital 5.509 (3.510,7.585) 3.549 (2.996,3.996)
λ: consumption habit formation 0.707 (0.570,0.847) 0.697 (0.662,0.733)
σc: risk aversion 1.159 (0.934,1.355) 1.597 (1.479,1.740)
σl: Frisch elasticity 1.333 (0.370,2.216) 1.053 (0.266,1.757)
ξp: price Calvo probability 0.749 (0.676,0.816) 0.844 (0.807,0.877)
ξw: wage Calvo probability 0.801 (0.707,0.937) 0.869 (0.834,0.896)
ιp: price indexation 0.266 (0.128,0.395) 0.376 (0.198,0.587)
ιw: wage indexation 0.648 (0.454,0.854) 0.286 (0.160,0.396)
ψ: capital utilization adjusting cost 0.636 (0.441,0.816) 0.678 (0.472,0.875)
Φ: steady-state price markup 1.535 (1.411,1.662) 1.501 (1.422,1.577)
ρ: inertia (policy rule) 0.837 (0.802,0.872) 0.935 (0.919,0.952)
rπ: inflation (policy rule) 1.756 (1.440,2.055) 1.571 (1.379,1.784)
ry: output gap (policy rule) 0.018 (0.000,0.037) 0.032 (0.004,0.062)
r∆y: output gap growth (policy rule) 0.177 (0.147,0.209) 0.097 (0.073,0.118)
πSS: quarterly steady-state inflation 0.901 (0.673,1.114) 0.58 (0.494,0.674)
100(β−1 − 1): quarterly discount rate 0.158 (0.068,0.250) 0.159 (0.128,0.192)
l̄: steady-state hours 1.397 (-1.497,4.400) 2.806 (1.703,3.926)
δ: steady-state growth rate 0.382 (0.344,0.418) 0.402 (0.383,0.424)
α: capital share 0.195 (0.162,0.225) 0.16 (0.138,0.181)
ρo: learning parameter - - 0.962 (0.954,0.970)
σa: Std. of productivity innovation 0.467 (0.423,0.509) 0.461 (0.430,0.482)
σb: Std. of consumption innovation 0.163 (0.082,0.257) 0.12 (0.110,0.128)
σi: Std. of investment innovation 0.335 (0.274,0.390) 0.352 (0.324,0.381)
σg: Std. of spending innovation 0.471 (0.433,0.508) 0.461 (0.437,0.485)
σp: Std. of price markup innovation 0.13 (0.110,0.152) 0.134 (0.119,0.146)
σw: Std. of wage markup shock 0.36 (0.319,0.398) 0.348 (0.321,0.380)
σR: Std. of policy innovation 0.22 (0.201,0.240) 0.211 (0.199,0.226)
ρa: Persistence of productivity shock 0.975 (0.960,0.991) 0.984 (0.978,0.989)
ρb: Persistence of consumption shock 0.581 (0.244,0.875) 0.651 (0.554,0.749)
ρi: Persistence of investment shock 0.78 (0.675,0.892) 0.398 (0.320,0.476)
ρg: Persistence of spending shock 0.97 (0.956,0.985) 0.981 (0.970,0.994)
ρp: Persistence of price markup shock 0.959 (0.927,0.995) 0.236 (0.087,0.387)
ρw: Persistence of wage markup shock 0.952 (0.879,0.997) 0.392 (0.112,0.635)
ρr: Persistence of policy shock 0.119 (0.023,0.218) 0.242 (0.172,0.315)
ρo: Persistence of learning parameter - - 0.962 (0.954,0.970)
µp: moving-average of price shock 0.916 (0.845,0.979) 0.455 (0.179,0.646)
µw: moving-average of wage shock 0.851 (0.780,0.919) 0.516 (0.378,0.659)
ρga: correlation of prod. and spend. shocks 0.537 (0.416,0.658) 0.498 (0.422,0.579)
coefficients are close to 0.5 for both markup shocks) in line with the findings of Slobodyan
and Wouters (2012b), whereas these markup shocks are very persistent under RE.
Table 4.2 shows the log data densities of the estimated model for each version of the
model (RE and AL) and each of the windows considered. Moreover, the fourth row of
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Table 4.2: Model fit comparison across windows: log density
Windows
61-81 66-86 71-91 76-96 81-01 86-06 91-11 96-16
AL -487.2 -513.3 -481.9 -454.1 -342.0 -304.1 -342.5 -367.4
RE -525.1 -535.2 -509.1 -473.5 -354.2 -316.4 -369.0 -377.7
Log difference 37.9 21.9 27.2 19.4 12.2 12.3 26.5 10.3
Table 4.2 shows rather large odds in favor of the AL across all windows.
To highlight the differences across the two alternative expectations hypotheses and the
subsamples, Figure 4.2 shows a selection of the estimated parameters that show higher
parameter instability. The lines with solid circles (squares) represent the subsample es-
timates under the RE (AL) hypothesis. Meanwhile, the shaded-lined areas between the
dashed lines (the area between the plain lines) are the 5%-95% confidence bands around
the RE (AL) estimates.7
At first sight, it is clear that the parameter estimates show less variability under AL
than under RE. The first row of graphs in Figure 4.2 shows that the persistence associated
with risk premium shocks, price- and wage-markup shocks, and monetary policy shocks
show a sizeable time variation. Notice also that the persistence of price- and wage-
markup shocks is lower in recent decades, which reduces the importance of supply shocks
relative to demand shocks. Moreover, the estimated values are lower under AL than
under RE. Similarly, the parameter estimates that measure the size (standard deviations)
of innovations differ by more across the two expectations hypothesis and sub-samples.
This is in contrast to the similarities found for these parameters under RE and AL when
the model is estimated for the whole sample.
The Calvo wage probability estimates under the two expectations hypotheses behave
rather differently for the sample window 1991:3-2001:2. The estimate under AL increases
while the estimate under RE decreases. Moreover, the estimate of the parameter featuring
price indexation to past inflation differs between the two expectations hypotheses in the
initial subsamples of the analysis but becomes closer after the sample window that starts
in 1976.
In line with the estimates for the whole sample discussed above, the posterior mean
of interest rate persistence is higher for all subsamples under AL. The last graph in the
third row displays the trend in the steady-state inflation estimate across subsamples.
Interestingly, and in line with the findings in Milani (2019), the estimated value is always
lower as pointed out above and also exhibits less variability under AL. These estimation
results suggest that the large variability of the inflation target estimated under RE may to
some extent be an artefact of the RE hypothesis that implicitly assumes that agents have
perfect knowledge of the central bank inflation target. In contrast, when agents learn the
inflation target, its estimate becomes much lower and rather stable
The last row of graphs in Figure 4.2 shows the high variation in the estimated per-
sistence of the investment shock under the two alternative expectations hypotheses, al-
though it is lower under AL. Next to the right, the estimated standard deviation of the
wage markup innovation shows a smoother downtrend in the most recent subsamples un-
der AL, which also contributes to the drop in the importance of supply shocks relative to
7The posterior means of all the estimated parameters under RE and AL for the eight sample windows
studied are available from the authors upon request.
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demand shocks. The next two figures to the right show the estimated standard deviations
of the investment specific technology shock and the price markup shock. In general, the
estimated standard deviation of all innovations under AL can be observed to be lower than
those estimated under RE. This finding is rather intuitive: The variance of the shocks
captures the degree of all sources of uncertainty under RE, but this is no longer so under



























Figure 4.2: Rolling-window selected parameter estimates
Note: The lines with solid circles represent the subsample estimates under the RE hypothesis. The lines with squares are the parameter estimates
under AL. The shaded-lined areas between the dashed lines (the area between the solid lines without any additional symbol) are the 5%-95%
confidence bands around the RE (AL) estimates.
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Over and above the visual inspection of Figure 4.2, the variability of parameter es-
timates across windows can be summarized by a quadratic distance function defined by










n (= 8) denotes the number of windows, θ̂ is the vector of estimated parameters obtained





is the inverse of the estimated covariance matrix of
θ̂.
This quadratic distance measure summarizes in a single statistic the variability of a
given set of parameters relative to the estimated parameter values obtained from the whole
sample under a particular expectation hypothesis.8 Moreover, this variability measure
can be computed for each individual parameter as well as for alternative subsets of model
parameters. Hence, it can help to assess which subsets of parameters are more time
(in)variant than others. This is important because the related literature emphasizes time
variation in different sets of parameters. Thus, according to the good-luck hypothesis
(e.g. Sims and Zha (2006)), the lower estimated parameter values characterizing the shock
process parameters are the main factor driving the Great Moderation. Alternatively, the
good-policy hypothesis (e.g. Clarida et al. (2000)) puts the emphasis on the stronger
responses of monetary policy to deviations of inflation from its target as the main factor
driving price stability and the Great Moderation.
Although the variability of monetary policy rule parameters and the shock process
parameters are likely to be strong candidates to explain the recent swings in the US
macroeconomic dynamics, it is also important to analyze the variability of the remaining
structural parameters for several reasons. In particular, stability of structural-deep pa-
rameters is a much needed feature when using the model as a tool to assess the outcomes of
alternative monetary policies. Thus, we compute the parameter variability measure J for
structural parameters and shock process parameters. In addition, focusing on structural
parameters, we also compute J for three selected groups of parameters: (i) the four Calvo
parameters featuring nominal rigidities (price and wage Calvo stickiness parameters, and
price and wage indexation parameters); (ii) the estimates of the policy rule parameters;
and (iii) the estimates of the remaining structural parameters. Finally, we also compute
J for the estimates of the two subsets of parameters that characterize exogenous shock
persistence, and the standard deviation of shock innovations.
Table 4.3 shows the value of J for the whole set of model parameters for both the RE
and AL versions of the model, for alternative subsets of parameters, for the eight windows,
and for the first five subsample windows (figures in parentheses), i.e. up to subsample
1981:3-2001:2, which does not include the latest two recessions (i.e. the 2001-recession
and the Great recession starting around 2008) or their aftermath.
We start by focusing on the parameter variability measure when using the eight sub-
samples. We observe that AL reduces our measure of parameter variability by roughly
8Notice that this measure resembles the quadratic loss function used in the simulated method of mo-




(roughly speaking, the parameters estimated with less precision—i.e. with higher variance— receive a
smaller weight in the distance function).
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Table 4.3: Comparative measure J
RE AL Relative measure
All parameters 0.167 (0.230) 0.054 (0.050) -67.67 (-78.26)
Structural 0.153 (0.207) 0.051 (0.050) -66.67 (-75.85)
Calvo parameters 0.035 (0.127) 0.003 (0.032) -91.43 (-74.80)
MP rule parameters 0.005 (0.060) 0.000 (0.004) -100.00 (-93.33)
Other structural parameters 0.104 (0.011) 0.034 (0.001) -67.31 (-90.91)
Shocks 0.178 (0.015) 0.261 (0.005) 46.63 (-66.67)
Persistence parameters 0.012 (0.001) 0.008 (0.000) -33.33 (-100.00)
Variances 0.174 (0.014) 0.251 (0.005) 44.25 (-64.29)
67.7% (from 0.167 under RE to 0.054 under AL) as shown in the last column, which
implies that AL absorbs a large proportion of the total parameter variability obtained
under RE. A similar finding holds when the focus is only on the subset of structural
parameters. Interestingly, the reduction in the variability measure implied by AL with
respect to RE is stronger for the Calvo model and policy rule parameters (at 91.4% and
100%, respectively). This last finding is in line with Sargent et al. (2006) and shows major
interaction between the beliefs of economic agents and shocks.9 In line with these results,
the parameter variability measure associated with the shock process parameters increases
substantially with AL (46.6%), due to the large increase in variability associated with the
estimates of the standard deviation of innovations under AL.
These findings are mostly qualitatively robust to those obtained by focusing only on
the first five subsample windows. However, the reduction in parameter variability across
the alternative sample windows implied by AL is stronger in this case than that obtained
for the whole set of windows, and carries over to all parameter subsets.
4.6 Macroeconomic dynamic swings
The comovement between nominal variables (the nominal interest rate, inflation) and real
variables (real output growth and hours worked) present large swings in the post-World
War II era. Thus, the correlation coefficients between real and nominal variables were
negative until the early 1980’s, but became positive in the two recent decades as shown
in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.3-4.6 display the correlations between pairs of nominal and real variables. In
each figure, the thick solid line denotes the actual correlation. The solid line with asterisk
and the closely spaced dot line show the correlations for each window implied by the model
estimated for the whole sample under RE and under AL, respectively. Meanwhile, the
solid line with circles and the dashed lines show the rolling-window correlation estimates
under RE and AL, respectively.10
The time-varying correlation between inflation and hours worked is shown in Fig-
ure 4.3. All models do a reasonable job in reproducing the dynamic swings in this cor-
relation statistic. Regarding the correlation between the nominal interest rate and hours
9A major difference between the two papers is that Sargent et al. (2006) emphasizes the role of
central bankers’ beliefs, whereas in our model the emphasis is on the role of the beliefs of private agents
(households and firms).
10This description also applies for Figure 4.7 and 4.8 discussed below.
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worked, all models reproduce well the strong dynamic swing since the early 1980’s as
depicted in Figure 4.4, but AL appears to perform slightly better than RE in fitting this
striking comovement pattern. Similarly, Figure 4.5 and 4.6 show that the estimated cor-
relations for the whole sample under AL are able to approximate the actual correlations
between inflation and output growth and between the nominal interest rate and output
growth better than the other specifications.
An analysis of the comovement between real and nominal variables suggests that the
negative correlation observed from the 1960’s to the early 1980’s was the result of strong
supply shocks (e.g. oil shocks). The intuition is simple, following arguments in Mankiw
(2003) (pp. 66-67): Strong supply shocks help to identify aggregate demand, which
describes a negative correlation between real and nominal variables at equilibrium. By
contrast, supply shocks have been much less important than demand shocks since the
mid 1980’s, as discussed above, which helps to identify the aggregate supply curve: A
positive correlation between real and nominal variables. In sum, changes in the relative
importance of supply and demand shocks may be an important driving force behind the
comovement swings observed in recent US data, as also stressed in Cassou and Vázquez
(2014).
In contrast to the above correlations, Figure 4.7 shows that the SW model has trouble
reproducing the large drop in correlation between inflation and the nominal interest rate
in recent decades (i.e. the Gibson paradox). Even though all models fall short of closely
replicating this comovement, it can be seen that the estimated correlations computed
under AL seem to reproduce the Gibson paradox better in the 1990’s. Moreover, the
ability of the model with money stressed in Casares and Vázquez (2018) to reproduce the
Gibson paradox indicates the importance of including money demand in the SW model to
account for this dynamic swing. By contrast, Figure 4.8 shows that the model under AL
(both for the whole sample and across subsamples) is unable to reproduce the strong fall
in inflation persistence observed since the early 1980’s. The model estimated for the whole
sample under RE comes closer than the AL specification to quantitatively reproducing
the declining trend of the inflation persistence, but it still falls short. The differences
between AL and RE in reproducing the fall in inflation persistence may be due to the
additional strong source of persistence induced by the AL mechanism.
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Figure 4.3: Correlation of worked hours and inflation
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996


























Figure 4.4: Correlation of worked hours and interest rate
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996
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Figure 4.5: Correlation of output growth and inflation
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996


























Figure 4.6: Correlation of output growth and interest rate
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996
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Figure 4.7: Correlation of interest rate and inflation
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996


























Figure 4.8: Inflation persistence
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996
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In order to discern the relative importance of AL expectations and parameter vari-
ability behind these correlation swings, we study two measures of fit for the estimated
correlations under each expectations hypothesis. First, we compute the mean absolute de-
viations (MAD) of the estimated correlations for each model specification, MAD(i, x, y),
defined as follows




∣∣∣ri,jx,y − ractual,jx,y ∣∣∣ ,
where n = 8 indicates the number of windows, ri,jx,y stands for the correlation coefficient
between variables x and y for model specification i and for window j, and ractual,jx,y denotes
the actual correlation between variables x and y for window j.
Since the estimated correlations for a few specifications show rather erratic shifts
across windows when compared to the actual correlations, we compute a second measure
of fit defined by the ratio between the standard deviation of the estimated correlation
across windows, for each model specification, and the standard deviation of the actual
correlation across windows. Formally,
Since the estimated correlations for a few specifications show rather erratic shifts
across windows when compared to the actual correlations, we compute a second measure
of fit defined by the ratio between the standard deviation of the estimated correlation
across windows, for each model specification, and the standard deviation of the actual
correlation across windows. Formally,




where σ(rix,y) (σ(ractualx,y )) denotes the standard deviation of the estimated correlation rx,y
for model specification i (actual data) across windows. Thus, a value of the statistic
RStDC(i, x, y) higher (lower) than one indicates that the estimated correlation between
variables x and y for model i shows larger (smaller) swings than those displayed by the
corresponding actual correlation.
Table 4.4 shows these two measures of fit for each correlation and model specification
studied. More precisely, the first column of Table 4.4 shows the second-moment statistics
(correlations) studied. The next four columns show the MAD(i, x, y)-statistic for each
estimated correlation and model specification considered. Finally, the last four columns
show the ratio of the standard deviations, RStDC(i, x, y), for each estimated correlation
and model specification analyzed.
For the MAD(i, x, y)-statistic, it can be observed that the estimated AL model, with
both the whole sample period and the rolling-window approach, fits the actual correlation
statistics between real and nominal variables better in general than the estimated RE
model. The opposite occurs for inflation persistence.
In regard to the RStDC(i, x, y) measure, Table 4.4 shows that the DSGE model
under the two expectation (RE and AL) specifications results in larger swings for the
correlations between real and nominal variables than the actual correlations. Nevertheless,
the estimated correlations of the DSGE model under AL show a better fit according to this
measure. Moreover, the rolling-window approach seems to result in too much variability
in these correlations between real and nominal variables. By contrast, the estimated
correlations between the two nominal variables and the inflation autocorrelation show
smoother swings than the actual correlations as the low values of the RStDC in the
last two rows of Table 4.4 indicate—i.e. all of them are well below one. This result is
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consistent with the finding that the alternative specifications of the DSGE model fall short
in quantitatively reproducing the drop in inflation persistence and the Gibson paradox
observed in recent decades.
Table 4.4: Correlation Deviations
Correlations MAD RStDC
RE AL RE AL
roll-window whole roll-window whole roll-window whole roll-window whole
Hours worked, inflation 0.099 0.140 0.095 0.118 1.443 1.501 1.389 1.438
Hours worked, interest rate 0.077 0.082 0.057 0.047 1.067 1.088 1.044 1.047
Output growth, inflation 0.182 0.256 0.133 0.116 1.512 2.120 1.227 1.490
Output growth, interest rate 0.257 0.317 0.216 0.176 1.395 1.794 1.223 1.202
Inflation, interest rate 0.104 0.134 0.096 0.124 0.748 0.621 0.847 0.760
Inflation autocorrelation 0.078 0.080 0.122 0.142 0.628 0.689 0.441 0.485
4.7 Conclusions
This paper studies parameter instability by estimating a standard medium-scale DSGE
model under both rational expectations and adaptive learning using a rolling-window
approach. The estimated DSGE model under adaptive learning improves the model fit
to the data compared to the rational expectations version. Estimation results further
show that assuming adaptive learning (rather than rational expectations) reduces the
estimated parameter variability by roughly two thirds. This reduction in the variability of
parameter estimates is even stronger for the parameters that feature nominal rigidities and
for the policy rule parameters. The improvement in the stability of structural parameter
estimates certainly strengthens the ability of the adaptive learning version of the DSGE
model to assess policies reliably.
The estimation results also show that the flexibility induced by the adaptive learning
hypothesis helps to explain the recent swings in the comovements between nominal and
real variables in the US. Nevertheless, our analysis also suggests that strong supply shocks
were the force behind the negative comovement in the first half of the sample, up to the
early 1980’s. Since then, dominant demand shocks seem to have caused the dramatic
swings in the correlations between the real and nominal variables.
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Brief overview of the SW model
Here we summarize the log-linear equations of the model. For a more detailed presen-
tation, we refer to the discussion in Smets and Wouters (2007).
• Aggregate resource constraint:
yt = cyct + iyit + zyzt + εgt , (A1)
where cy = CY = 1− gy − iy, iy =
I
Y
= (γ − 1 + δ) K
Y
, and zy = rk KY are steady-state
ratios. As in Smets and Wouters (2007), the depreciation rate and the exogenous
spending-GDP ratio are fixed in the estimation procedure at δ = 0.025 and gy =
0.18.
• Consumption equation:
ct = c1crt−1,t + (1− c1)Etct+1 + c2 (lt − Etlt+1)− c3(Rt − Etπt+1) + εbt , (A2)
where c1 = h/γ1+(h/γ) , c2 =
(σc−1)wL/(φwC)




it = i1it−1 + (1− i1)Etit+1 + i2qt + εit, (A3)
where i1 = 11+β , and i2 =
1
(1+β)γ2ϕ with β = βγ
(1−σc).
• Arbitrage condition (value of capital, qt):
qt = q1Etqt+1 + (1− q1)Etrkt+1 − (Rt − Etπt+1) + c−13 εbt , (A4)
where q1 = βγ−1(1− δ) = (1−δ)(rk+1−δ) .
• Log-linearized aggregate production function:
yt = φp (αkst + (1− α)lt + εat ) , (A5)
where φp = 1 + φY = 1 +
Steady-state fixed cost
Y
and α is the capital-share in the
production function.
• Effective capital:
kst = kt−1 + zt. (A6)
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• Capital utilization:
zt = z1rkt , (A7)
where z1 = 1−ψψ .
• Capital accumulation equation:
kt = k1kt−1 + (1− k1)it + k2εit, (A8)









µpt = mplt − wt = α (kst − lt) + εat − wt. (A9)
• New-Keynesian Phillips curve:
πt = π1πrt−1,t + π2Etπt+1 − π3µ
p
t + π4εpt . (A10)
where π1 = ιp1+βιp , π2 =
β
1+βιp




, and π4 = 1+βιp1+βιp . The
coefficient of the curvature of the Kimball goods market aggregator, included in the
definition of A, is fixed in the estimation procedure at εp = 10 as in Smets and
Wouters (2007).
• Optimal demand for capital by firms:
− (kst − lt) + wt = rkt . (A11)
• Wage markup equation:




ct − (h/γ) crt−1,t
))
. (A12)
• Real wage dynamic equation:
wt = w1wt−1 + (1− w1) (Etwt+1 + Etπt+1)− w2πt − w3πt−1 − w4µwt + εwt . (A13)
where w1 = 11+β , w2 =
1+βιw
1+β , w3 =
ιw







curvature of the Kimball labor aggregator fixed at εw = 10.0 and a steady-state
wage mark-up fixed at φw = 1.5 as in Smets and Wouters (2007).
• Monetary policy rule:
Rt = ρRt−1 + (1− ρ)[rππt + ryỹt)] + r∆y∆ỹt + εRt , (A14)
where the output gap is defined as ỹt = yt − φpεat (i.e. the output gap is defined as
the deviation of output from its underlying neutral productivity process).
Equations-and-variables summary
- Set of equations:
Equations (A1)-(A14) determine solution paths for 14 endogenous variables.
- Set of variables:
Endogenous variables (14): yt, ct, it, zt, lt, Rt, πt, qt, rkt , kst , kt, µwt , µ
p
t , and wt
Predetermined variables (7): ct−1, it−1, kt−1, πt−1, wt−1, Rt−1, and yt−1
Exogenous variables (7): AR(1) technology shock εat = ρaεat−1+ηat , AR(1) risk premium
shock εbt = ρbεbt−1 + ηbt , AR(1) exogenous spending shock cross-correlated to technology
innovations εgt = ρgεgt−1 + ηgt + ρgaηat , AR(1) investment shock εit = ρiεit−1 + ηit, AR(1)
monetary policy shock εRt = ρRεRt−1 + ηRt , ARMA(1,1) price mark-up shock ε
p
t = ρpεpt−1 +
ηpt − µpηpt−1, and ARMA(1,1) wage mark-up shock εwt = ρwεwt−1 + ηwt − µwηwt−1.
AL expectation formation
This part of the appendix provides a brief description of how AL works.1 The model
contains fourteen endogenous variables summarized by the vector yt. In addition, the
stochastic structure of the model is determined by seven exogenous shocks and their inno-
vations. Neutral and investment-specific technological progress, risk premium, exogenous
spending and non-systematic monetary policy shocks are represented by a first-order au-
toregressive process, whereas price and wage markup shocks are modelled as ARMA(1,1)
processes. The vector wt represents both the seven exogenous variables and the lagged
innovations for the markup shocks. After linearization around the deterministic steady











+ A2Etyt+1 +B0εt = const. (A15)










where the matrices T and R are non-linear functions of the model, θ; and the intercept
µ is a zero vector under RE. The vector y can be further decomposed into a vector ys
of state variables (those appearing with a lag), a vector yf of forward-looking variables
(showing up with a lead) and the so called static variables. More precise, agents have
to form expectations on seven forward-looking variables in the SW model: consumption,
investment, hours worked, wages, inflation, and the price and the return of existing capital.
Under AL, the expectations of the forward-looking variables, Etyt+1 , are defined
as linear functions of variables entering in the information set of agents, whose learning
coefficients are updated as explained below. Once the expectations of the forward-looking
variables, Etyt+1 , are computed they are plugged into the matrix representation of the










where the matrices µt, Tt and Rt are time-varying nonlinear functions of structural pa-
rameters (entering in matrices A0, A1, A2, and B0) together with learning coefficients
discussed next.
The perceived law of motion process is generally defined as follows:
yt+1 = Xtβt−1 + ut+1,
1See Slobodyan and Wouters (2012a) for a detailed description.
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where y is the vector containing the k forward-looking variables of the model, X is the
matrix of the k×r regressors, β is the vector of the r updating learning coefficients, which
includes an intercept, and u is a vector of errors. These errors are linear combinations
of the true model innovations, ε. So, the variance-covariance matrix, Σ = E[utu′t], is
non-diagonal.
Agents are further assumed to behave as econometricians under AL. In particular, it
is assumed that they use a linear projection method in which the parameters are updated
to form their expectations for each forward-looking variable:
Etyt+1 = Xtβt−1.
Thus, agents update their learning coefficient estimates using data up to time t−1, but
Xt contains contemporaneous values of the regressors. The updating parameter vector, β,
is further assumed to follow an autoregressive process where agents’ beliefs are updated
through a Kalman filter. This updating process can be represented as in Slobodyan and
Wouters (2012a) by the following equation:





where F is a diagonal matrix with the learning parameter |ρ| ≤ 1 on the main diagonal
and vt are white noise errors with variance-covariance matrix V.
Following Slobodyan and Wouters (2012a), we assume that AL agents forecast the
values of the forward-looking variables using an AR(2) process for each variable. Notice
that this AL assumption deviates from RE in three important ways. First, the coefficients
in the forecasting models are not restricted to be consistent with the decision rules of
agents. Second, the information set that is used in the AR(2) forecasting models is
much smaller than the state-variable vector that would be used under RE. Finally, the
coefficients of the forecasting model are updated using a Kalman filter procedure briefly
described next.
The Kalman filter updating and transition equations for the belief coefficients and the
corresponding covariance matrix are given by











. βt|t−1 is the estimate of β using the information
up to time t − 1, and Rt|t−1 is the mean squared error associated with βt|t−1. Therefore,
the updated learning vector βt|t is equal to the previous one, βt|t−1, plus a correction term




. In addition, the mean squared error,
Rt|t, associated with this updated estimate, βt|t, is given by







with Rt+1|t = FRt|tF ′ + V .




























Table I.1: Priors and Estimated Posteriors of the Structural Parameters under RE
Parameters Distribution Mean SD 61 66 71 76 81 86 91 96 measure
Log Likelihood -525.1 -535.17 -509.13 -473.52 -354.23 -316.41 -368.98 -377.71
ϕ: Investment adjustment cost Normal 4 1.5 4.17 4.64 4.69 4.5 6.01 5.55 5.64 5.99 1.8503e-05
σc: Risk aversion Normal 1.50 0.375 1.26 1.11 0.93 1.23 1.4 1.01 0.78 0.96 8.6676e-05
λ: External habit degree Beta 0.7 0.1 0.76 0.75 0.78 0.76 0.67 0.6 0.75 0.69 0.0001357
ξw: Calvo parameter wages Beta 0.5 0.1 0.85 0.78 0.8 0.66 0.64 0.66 0.53 0.75 3.7893e-06
σl: Frisch elasticity Normal 2 0.5 1.33 1.45 1.62 1.6 1.55 1.49 1.93 1.16 2.3333e-06
ξp: Calvo parameter prices Beta 0.5 0.10 0.58 0.57 0.66 0.68 0.76 0.84 0.79 0.81 8.8983e-06
ιw: Indexation to past wages Beta 0.5 0.15 0.65 0.66 0.68 0.61 0.47 0.49 0.51 0.44 1.6796e-06
ιp: Indexation to past prices Beta 0.5 0.15 0.32 0.48 0.77 0.52 0.36 0.42 0.36 0.28 0.054502
ψ: Capacity utilization cost Beta 0.5 0.15 0.18 0.41 0.38 0.41 0.63 0.63 0.69 0.8 0.00020419
φp: Fixed cost share Normal 1.25 0.125 1.49 1.47 1.44 1.53 1.5 1.42 1.34 1.36 1.7554e-05
rπ: Taylor rule inflation feedback Normal 1.5 0.25 1.34 1.49 1.55 1.73 1.71 1.72 1.88 1.73 2.3455e-05
ρ: Interest rate persistence Beta 0.75 0.10 0.83 0.8 0.8 0.77 0.8 0.84 0.85 0.89 0.015599
ry: Taylor rule output level feedback Normal 0.125 0.05 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.03 0.08 0.18 0.02 0.1 2.4518e-05
r∆y: Taylor rule output growth feedback Normal 0.125 0.05 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.0013113
π̄: Steady state inflation rate Gamma 0.625 0.1 0.7 0.81 0.79 0.82 0.69 0.65 0.67 0.58 0.00054463
100(β−1 − 1): Time preference rate Gamma 0.25 0.1 0.21 0.29 0.26 0.34 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.15 0.0036708
l̄: Steady state hours Normal 0.0 2.0 6.17 6.17 5.85 7.05 8.27 9.03 0.58 5.17 0.010026
δ̄: Net growth rate in percent Normal 0.4 0.10 0.43 0.35 0.36 0.39 0.48 0.48 0.36 0.34 0.00041995
ρga: correlation of prod. and spend. shocks Normal 0.5 0.25 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.47 0.47 0.51 0.41 0.52 1.4251e-05
α: Capital share Normal 0.3 0.05 0.2 0.22 0.2 0.22 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.15 6.3689e-07
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Table I.2: Priors and Estimated Posteriors of the Shocks Processes under RE
Parameters Distribution Mean SD 61 66 71 76 81 86 91 96 measure
ρa: Persistence productivity shock Beta 0.5 0.20 0.96 0.86 0.85 0.83 0.91 0.91 0.95 0.95 3.3038e-05
ρb: Persistence consumption innov. shock Beta 0.5 0.20 0.32 0.4 0.7 0.19 0.25 0.83 0.84 0.89 3.3818e-05
ρg: Persistence spending shock Beta 0.5 0.20 0.89 0.96 0.88 0.83 0.96 0.97 0.92 0.9 2.7399e-05
ρi: Persistence investment shock Beta 0.5 0.20 0.69 0.65 0.82 0.82 0.66 0.59 0.63 0.7 2.4951e-05
ρr: Persistence monetary policy shock Beta 0.5 0.20 0.21 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.17 0.38 0.49 0.47 1.5778e-05
ρp: Persistence price markup shock Beta 0.5 0.20 0.94 0.64 0.38 0.66 0.69 0.67 0.79 0.84 9.2664e-06
ρw: Persistence wage markup shock Beta 0.5 0.20 0.39 0.72 0.75 0.89 0.84 0.75 0.99 0.31 7.2879e-05
µw: Coefficient on Ma term wage markup Beta 0.5 0.2 0.78 0.51 0.82 0.55 0.5 0.53 0.66 0.68 8.1919e-06
µp: Coefficient on MA term price markup Beta 0.5 0.2 0.35 0.6 0.43 0.5 0.56 0.52 0.79 0.52 0.00034818
σa: Productivity shock Invgamma 0.1 2 0.54 0.52 0.44 0.38 0.35 0.38 0.48 0.48 0.0587
σb: Investment specific technology shock Invgamma 0.1 2 0.3 0.28 0.18 0.28 0.2 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.0869
σg: Spending shock Invgamma 0.1 2 0.53 0.57 0.55 0.48 0.43 0.4 0.37 0.35 0.073
σi: Investment specific technology shock Invgamma 0.1 2 0.46 0.5 0.34 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.32 0.31 0.0536
σm: Monetary policy shock Invgamma 0.1 2 0.28 0.32 0.3 0.27 0.14 0.09 0.1 0.09 0.0963
σp: Price markup shock Invgamma 0.1 2 0.15 0.19 0.21 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.0393


























Table I.3: Priors and Estimated Posteriors of the Structural Parameters under AL
Parameters Distribution Mean SD 61 66 71 76 81 86 91 96 measure
Log Likelihood -487.21 -513.27 -481.85 -454.05 -342.08 -304.11 -342.54 -358.13
ϕ: Investment adjustment cost Normal 4 1.5 3.52 4.14 2.77 5.13 4.14 5.09 3.68 7.28 4.7153e-05
σc: Risk aversion Normal 1.50 0.375 1.6 1.62 1.71 1.92 1.55 1.64 1.24 1.36 0.00028292
λ: External habit degree Beta 0.7 0.1 0.73 0.71 0.65 0.68 0.6 0.73 0.65 0.82 0.00016988
ξw: Calvo parameter wages Beta 0.5 0.1 0.77 0.74 0.81 0.75 0.73 0.68 0.82 0.67 0.0005118
σl: Frisch elasticity Normal 2 0.5 1.27 1.83 1.68 1.56 1.71 1.58 1.71 1.74 0.0013297
ξp: Calvo parameter prices Beta 0.5 0.10 0.65 0.61 0.64 0.66 0.7 0.78 0.86 0.83 0.00039395
ιw: Indexation to past wages Beta 0.5 0.15 0.47 0.56 0.57 0.4 0.35 0.43 0.37 0.42 0.00027372
ιp: Indexation to past prices Beta 0.5 0.15 0.26 0.37 0.19 0.46 0.4 0.54 0.32 0.48 0.0053825
ψ: Capacity utilization cost Beta 0.5 0.15 0.44 0.41 0.38 0.41 0.67 0.67 0.83 0.74 0.00013178
φp: Fixed cost share Normal 1.25 0.125 1.49 1.47 1.39 1.53 1.5 1.48 1.47 1.39 1.9435e-06
rπ: Taylor rule inflation feedback Normal 1.5 0.25 1.56 1.43 1.23 1.59 1.54 1.68 1.43 1.68 2.3925e-05
ρ: Interest rate persistence Beta 0.75 0.10 0.94 0.9 0.95 0.86 0.83 0.89 0.91 0.91 0.0093352
ry: Taylor rule output level feedback Normal 0.125 0.05 0.11 0.1 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.12 0 0.05 1.7835e-05
r∆y: Taylor rule output growth feedback Normal 0.125 0.05 0.18 0.16 0.21 0.15 0.1 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.00060662
π̄: Steady state inflation rate Gamma 0.625 0.1 0.6 0.65 0.67 0.75 0.64 0.64 0.55 0.55 0.00053542
100(β−1 − 1): Time preference rate Gamma 0.25 0.1 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.23 0.19 0.16 0.24 0.14 0.00036863
l̄: Steady state hours Normal 0.0 2.0 2.7 3.88 4.3 5.58 7.79 8.09 3.54 3.33 0.0025182
δ̄: Net growth rate in percent Normal 0.4 0.10 0.42 0.36 0.35 0.39 0.47 0.42 0.42 0.3 0.00080955
ρga: correlation of prod. and spend. shocks Normal 0.5 0.25 0.54 0.6 0.65 0.44 0.48 0.54 0.44 0.56 5.6729e-06
α: Capital share Normal 0.3 0.05 0.19 0.2 0.19 0.2 0.23 0.2 0.18 0.14 6.8685e-06
ρo: Learning persistence Beta 0.5 0.288 0.91 0.91 0.94 0.93 0.98 0.93 0.96 0.33 1.2325e-05
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Table I.4: Priors and Estimated Posteriors of the Shocks Processes under AL
Parameters Distribution Mean SD 61 66 71 76 81 86 91 96 measure
ρa: Persistence productivity shock Beta 0.5 0.20 0.92 0.86 0.74 0.78 0.76 0.97 0.93 0.96 4.946e-05
ρb: Persistence consumption innov. premium shock Beta 0.5 0.20 0.27 0.47 0.65 0.37 0.35 0.54 0.69 0.49 6.2716e-06
ρg: Persistence spending shock Beta 0.5 0.20 0.87 0.94 0.86 0.77 0.94 0.96 0.94 0.9 3.8547e-05
ρi: Persistence investment shock Beta 0.5 0.20 0.46 0.5 0.64 0.5 0.45 0.47 0.32 0.67 3.0676e-05
ρr: Persistence monetary policy shock Beta 0.5 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.1 0.22 0.55 0.6 0.51 1.3189e-05
ρp: Persistence price markup shock Beta 0.5 0.20 0.85 0.48 0.52 0.49 0.41 0.28 0.28 0.34 1.6762e-05
ρw: Persistence wage markup shock Beta 0.5 0.20 0.39 0.49 0.56 0.79 0.63 0.55 0.51 0.29 6.1847e-05
µw: Coefficient on Ma term wage markup Beta 0.5 0.2 0.73 0.5 0.42 0.65 0.52 0.54 0.43 0.56 4.7997e-07
µp: Coefficient on MA term price markup Beta 0.5 0.2 0.57 0.48 0.36 0.45 0.44 0.39 0.5 0.66 3.7875e-05
σa: Productivity shock Invgamma 0.1 2 0.52 0.51 0.42 0.37 0.35 0.37 0.42 0.48 0.0625
σb: Investment specific technology shock Invgamma 0.1 2 0.13 0.19 0.14 0.18 0.15 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.0403
σg: Spending shock Invgamma 0.1 2 0.52 0.55 0.55 0.48 0.42 0.39 0.36 0.34 0.0748
σi: Investment specific technology shock Invgamma 0.1 2 0.36 0.45 0.38 0.45 0.41 0.33 0.23 0.25 0.0666
σm: Monetary policy shock Invgamma 0.1 2 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.27 0.14 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.1008
σp: Price markup shock Invgamma 0.1 2 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.1 0.11 0.0457
σw: Wage markup shock Invgamma 0.1 2 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.21 0.27 0.3 0.38 0.49 0.1239


































Table J.1: Priors and Estimated Posteriors of the Structural Parameters
RE AL
Parameters Distribution Mean SD Mean Conf. Interv. Mean Conf. Interv.
ϕ: Investment adjustment cost Normal 4 1.5 5.509 3.51-7.585 3.549 2.996-3.996
σc: Risk aversion Normal 1.50 0.375 1.159 0.934-1.355 1.597 1.479-1.74
λ: External habit degree Beta 0.7 0.1 0.707 0.57-0.847 0.697 0.662-0.733
ξw: Calvo parameter wages Beta 0.5 0.1 0.801 0.707-0.937 0.869 0.834-0.896
σl: Frisch elasticity Normal 2 0.5 1.333 0.37-2.216 1.053 0.266-1.757
ξp: Calvo parameter prices Beta 0.5 0.10 0.749 0.676-0.816 0.844 0.807-0.877
ιw: Indexation to past wages Beta 0.5 0.15 0.648 0.454-0.854 0.286 0.16-0.396
ιp: Indexation to past prices Beta 0.5 0.15 0.266 0.128-0.395 0.376 0.198-0.587
ψ: Capacity utilization cost Beta 0.5 0.15 0.636 0.441-0.816 0.678 0.472-0.875
φp: Fixed cost share Normal 1.25 0.125 1.535 1.411-1.662 1.501 1.422-1.577
rπ: Taylor rule inflation feedback Normal 1.5 0.25 1.756 1.44-2.055 1.571 1.379-1.784
ρ: Interest rate persistence Beta 0.75 0.10 0.837 0.802-0.872 0.935 0.919-0.952
ry: Taylor rule output level feedback Normal 0.125 0.05 0.018 0-0.037 0.032 0.004-0.062
r∆y: Taylor rule output growth feedback Normal 0.125 0.05 0.177 0.147-0.209 0.097 0.073-0.118
π̄: Steady state inflation rate Gamma 0.625 0.1 0.901 0.673-1.114 0.58 0.494-0.674
100(β−1 − 1): Time preference rate Gamma 0.25 0.1 0.158 0.068-0.25 0.159 0.128-0.192
l̄: Steady state hours Normal 0.0 2.0 1.397 -1.497-4.4 2.806 1.703-3.926
δ̄: Net growth rate in percent Normal 0.4 0.10 0.382 0.344-0.418 0.402 0.383-0.424
ρga: correlation of prod. and spend. shocks Normal 0.5 0.25 0.537 0.416-0.658 0.498 0.422-0.579
α: Capital share Normal 0.3 0.05 0.195 0.162-0.225 0.16 0.138-0.181
ρo: Learning persistence Beta 0.5 0.288 0.962 0.954-0.97
ρa: Persistence productivity shock Beta 0.5 0.20 0.975 0.96-0.991 0.984 0.978-0.989
ρb: Persistence consumption innov. premium shock Beta 0.5 0.20 0.581 0.244-0.875 0.651 0.554-0.749
ρg: Persistence spending shock Beta 0.5 0.20 0.97 0.956-0.985 0.981 0.97-0.994
ρi: Persistence investment shock Beta 0.5 0.20 0.78 0.675-0.892 0.398 0.32-0.476
ρr: Persistence monetary policy shock Beta 0.5 0.20 0.119 0.023-0.218 0.242 0.172-0.315
ρp: Persistence price markup shock Beta 0.5 0.20 0.959 0.927-0.995 0.236 0.087-0.387
ρw: Persistence wage markup shock Beta 0.5 0.20 0.952 0.879-0.997 0.392 0.112-0.635
µw: Coefficient on Ma term wage markup Beta 0.5 0.2 0.851 0.78-0.919 0.516 0.378-0.659
µp: Coefficient on MA term price markup Beta 0.5 0.2 0.916 0.845-0.979 0.455 0.179-0.646
σa: Productivity shock Invgamma 0.1 2 0.467 0.423-0.509 0.461 0.43-0.482
σb: Investment specific technology shock Invgamma 0.1 2 0.163 0.082-0.257 0.12 0.11-0.128
σg: Spending shock Invgamma 0.1 2 0.471 0.433-0.508 0.461 0.437-0.485
σi: Investment specific technology shock Invgamma 0.1 2 0.335 0.274-0.39 0.352 0.324-0.381
σm: Monetary policy shock Invgamma 0.1 2 0.22 0.201-0.24 0.211 0.199-0.226
σp: Price markup shock Invgamma 0.1 2 0.13 0.11-0.152 0.134 0.119-0.146
σw: Wage markup shock Invgamma 0.1 2 0.36 0.319-0.398 0.348 0.321-0.38
Comparison of estimates under RE and
AL
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Inflation autocor. 61 66 71 76 81 86 91 96 All period
Data 0.87167 0.80567 0.84713 0.89823 0.80554 0.70807 0.52772 0.49657 0.88821
RE 0.87417 0.85253 0.8144 0.91977 0.70061 0.68065 0.65965 0.75622 0.92939
AL 0.89092 0.86754 0.91954 0.95806 0.88561 0.87866 0.78659 0.74889 0.95482
RE-whole 0.91756 0.86942 0.90166 0.942 0.84829 0.77173 0.69898 0.65429 0.92939
AL-whole 0.94483 0.91627 0.93302 0.96224 0.92727 0.86782 0.77132 0.77586 0.95482
Corr infla-interest
Data 0.81451 0.47049 0.44451 0.65888 0.74558 0.38614 0.15402 0.25796 0.69576
RE 0.8484 0.52827 0.45288 0.77675 0.70576 0.4569 0.35326 0.56195 0.77802
AL 0.86058 0.50696 0.42549 0.78651 0.71665 0.51115 0.27155 0.52374 0.77778
RE-whole 0.8435 0.53787 0.52417 0.74406 0.78297 0.53046 0.47725 0.56107 0.77802
AL-whole 0.85991 0.59584 0.57339 0.76162 0.78753 0.48343 0.33575 0.52283 0.77778
Corr hours-interest
Data -0.21931 -0.25635 -0.10762 -0.39508 -0.52592 0.55099 0.83896 0.90406 0.25642
RE -0.39537 -0.34045 -0.16057 -0.55129 -0.56402 0.44893 0.83281 0.90252 0.18922
AL -0.33278 -0.30305 -0.23266 -0.48265 -0.54657 0.52118 0.81631 0.89546 0.22361
RE-whole -0.39216 -0.36194 -0.24317 -0.5076 -0.56775 0.4883 0.86175 0.90954 0.18922
AL-whole -0.30828 -0.31463 -0.18346 -0.45741 -0.55681 0.5041 0.84985 0.90921 0.22361
Corr hours-infla.
Data -0.50491 -0.18873 -0.2418 -0.39219 -0.5505 -0.23044 0.17447 0.24696 -0.045209
RE -0.58988 -0.18041 -0.28627 -0.49108 -0.5761 -0.29235 0.35354 0.53306 -0.063665
AL -0.50997 -0.013146 -0.25341 -0.49529 -0.63609 -0.23745 0.27189 0.52112 -0.049456
RE-whole -0.64699 -0.31755 -0.38612 -0.50704 -0.63281 -0.20205 0.41387 0.48586 -0.063665
AL-whole -0.59322 -0.29584 -0.33427 -0.4594 -0.66092 -0.28187 0.33992 0.50555 -0.049456
Corr output growth-infla.
Data -0.39546 -0.35835 -0.35197 -0.20393 -0.4193 -0.22228 0.0087894 0.039892 -0.21117
RE -0.6579 -0.35902 -0.40643 -0.48336 -0.63684 -0.6204 0.099992 -0.10985 -0.53422
AL -0.35439 -0.28191 -0.13077 -0.24168 -0.6413 -0.42255 0.094536 -0.1386 -0.35497
RE-whole -0.73958 -0.59816 -0.5794 -0.54841 -0.68936 -0.53396 0.2707 0.091484 -0.53422
AL-whole -0.54767 -0.47215 -0.44215 -0.36337 -0.48936 -0.3938 0.15436 0.06477 -0.35497
Corr output growth-interest
Data -0.35372 -0.25871 -0.26733 -0.2212 -0.23506 -0.047992 0.25568 0.20064 -0.094075
RE -0.75004 -0.45201 -0.2446 -0.51716 -0.51785 -0.55856 0.27569 -0.13699 -0.4816
AL -0.54409 -0.58015 -0.45283 -0.34419 -0.60307 -0.28658 0.17748 -0.025384 -0.29184
RE-whole -0.7547 -0.6151 -0.62469 -0.69097 -0.55844 -0.39304 0.39709 0.059819 -0.4816




The present thesis aims to study the importance of real-time data inclusion, financial
frictions, asymmetric information and the variability of structural parameters from a
macroeconomic perspective with a focus on the interaction between the monetary policies
and the real economy. This dissertation consists of three chapters, all of them are self-
contained works.
The first chapter of the thesis clearly shows that both the Federal Reserve and the Bank
of England take into account real–time inflation forecasts when implementing monetary
policy, which induces an important new inflation bias source in both countries, although
they do so in quite different ways. The Federal Reserve focuses on monitoring revised
inflation during low unemployment periods, but it weights real-time inflation heavily in
its decision making during high unemployment episodes. These results are in line with
those found in Cassou et al. (2016). In contrast, the Bank of England uses a roughly
equally-weighted average of real-time and revised inflation in its decision making which
is fairly robust over the business cycle. Moreover, as in Ruge-Murcia (2003a, 2004) and
Cassou et al. (2012) we find that the Ruge-Murcia asymmetric preference bias remains
significant. In particular, the preferences of the two central banks are asymmetric, with
stronger action taken when unemployment (output) is above (below) its natural rate
(potential level) than when it is below (above).
As noted above, this new source of inflation bias can be a consequence of the degree of
central bank independence that can differ from country to country. In order to compare
the different degrees of real-time targeting we extend our analysis to other countries.
Specifically, we include two European countries with independent monetary policies and
three countries outside the European Union. Our results show that real-time inflation
is an important new inflation bias source for all the countries. Specifically, the central
banks of Australia and New Zealand follow closely the targeting policy of the Fed. This
is in contrast to the central banks of Canada and Denmark that seem to be more close
to the targeting policy of the Bank of England but they weight less heavily revised data
during bad economic times. However, the central bank of Sweden seems not to take into
account real-time data in their policy decision making at all.
Our analysis also tentatively suggests a relationship between the quality of the initial
announcements of inflation as a predictor of final revised inflation and the weight given
to real-time inflation in the policy function. Thus, US, Australia and New Zealand seem
to focus only on real-time inflation during bad economic times. However, the Central
Bank of Sweden seems to focus only on revised inflation whether the economy is doing
well or not. The empirical evidence for UK and Denmark was not clear-cut. However,
after taking into account the threshold that characterises the revision process into our
estimation, the empirical evidence supports this hypothesis.
The second chapter presents and evaluates a model that helps study the role of the
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financial sector in the Spanish liquidity trap. We find that the financial frictions are
able to explain the fluctuations of the macroeconomic variables in Spain. Our model is a
variant of Christiano et al. (2014), we integrate a foreign sector that supplies government
bonds to the Spanish banks of the type studied by Moreno et al. (2014).
We estimate the model for Spain over the period 2000Q1-2017Q4. We use quarterly
observations of ten macroeconomic time series that are standardly used in the estima-
tion of DSGE models and three financial series: credit to non financial corporations,
entrepreneurial net worth and the risk premium of sovereign bonds. Estimation results
show that 52% of the variability of output and 89% of the variability of credit in the
business cycle are explained by anticipated risk shocks in the economy. These shocks
account for the episode of the credit crunch during the Spanish recession and the con-
traction of investment and output. Such a sequence has been observed during the last
recession starting around 2008 in Spain.
In the third chapter we estimate a medium-scale DSGE model both under rational
expectations and adaptive learning using a rolling window approach to try to answer to
the “Lucas Critique”.
The results show that the inclusion of AL absorbs a large proportion of the total
parameter variability obtained under RE. At the same time, the inclusion of AL has in-
creased the fit of the model and has shown that it is able to correct the high estimated
values of persistence and stickiness that we obtain under the rational expectations as-
sumption. Overall, our estimation results reinforce those found by Bullard and Singh
(2012) using a learning mechanism.
Moreover, the estimation based on the whole example under AL (i.e. assuming in-
variant parameters) is able to reproduce better the actual changes in the comovements
between real and nominal variables. Our analysis also suggests that the strong sup-
ply shocks were the forces behind the negative comovement between nominal and real
variables during the first part of the sample period analysed (i.e. the subsample period
1961-1981). Afterwards, dominant demand shocks could have caused the dramatic swings
in the correlations between the real and nominal variables. Needless to say that this re-
lationship is suggestive and further research is warranted.
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